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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

ON THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE LAW OF THE FORUM
BRAINERD CURRIE*

I.

DISPOSITION OF A PROBLEM

On November 9, 1955, Civil Action No. 50-170 came on for trial before
the Honorable Alexander Bicks in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. The pleadings and the testimony for the
plaintiff, one Leo Walton, a citizen of Arkansas, tended to establish that on
January 5, 1947, as he was driving to work, a head-on collision occurred
between his vehicle and a truck owned by the defendant, a Delaware corporation; that at the time the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for his
own safety; that the defendant's truck was operated negligently, particularly
in that it was entirely on the wrong side of the road and in that only one
headlight was operating although there was a heavy fog; that this negligence
was the proximate cause of the collision; that the driver of the truck was an
employee of the defendant engaged in the defendant's business; and that
as a result of the collision the plaintiff sustained permanent injuries which
occasioned loss of wages at his usual vocation, which was that of an aircraft
pilot. At the close of the plaintiff's case, on motion of the defendant, the
court directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff
had failed to establish a cause of action. The consequent judgment was
affirmed by the court of appeals.'
The reader, challenged to guess the basis for this decision, might well
have a difficult time of it. The facts stated would seem to give rise to a cause
of action under the law of New York, or of Arkansas, or of Delaware, or
of almost any jurisdiction with which most of us are familiar. A clue is
provided in the title of this article, with its indication that the subject for
discussion relates to the conflict of laws; and, indeed, the cause was lost
because one additional fact was disclosed by the complaint and testimony:
the collision occurred in Saudi Arabia. Given this information, the reader

may perhaps feel that the guessing game was, after all, not a particularly
interesting one; of course, the law of the place of injury determines liability
in tort, and what doubtless happened was that inquiry into the law of Saudi
Arabia revealed some provision which precluded recovery.
That, however, is not the way it happened. Neither the complaint nor
the answer made any reference to the law of Saudi Arabia. The plaintiff
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Fellow, Center for Advanced Study
in the Behavioral Sciences, 1957-1958.
1. Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
872 (1956). The statement of facts in the text is based in part on the record as contained
in the appendix to appellant's brief in the court of appeals.
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introduced no evidence of that law. The defendant introduced no evidence
at all. Neither in the briefs nor in the record nor in the opinion of the court
of appeals is there identification of any aspect of Saudi Arabian law which
would preclude recovery. Where, then, was the "conflict of laws"? Here
the law of the forum-that is to say, the law of New York2 -was displaced
not by a contrary foreign law, given preference by the system of conflict of
laws, but by the mere logic of the system itself.
Such a result was not unprecedented. A similar one had been announced
and its rationale expounded in all its conceptual rigor by Mr. justice Holmes
in the leading case of Cuba R.R. v. Crosby:
*.I when an action is brought upon a cause arising outside of the
jurisdiction . ..the duty of the court is not to administer its notion
of justice but to enforce an obligation that has been created by a
different law. .

.

. The law of the forum is material only as setting

a limit of policy beyond which such obligations will not be enforced
there. With very rare exceptions the liabilities of parties to each
2. Since the district court's jurisdiction was invoked because of diversity of citizenship, it was assumed that the law of New York, as distinguished from some federal
common law, constituted the "substantive" law of the forum, and furnished the choice-of-

law rule under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S-. 64 (1938), and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). That assumption will not be disputed here. It may

not be unreasonable, however, to plant a seed of heretical doubt. It is clear that the
scope of the Erie doctrine is not coterminous with diversity cases. HART & WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 697 (1953). The doctrine is applied in
some nondiversity cases, see, e.g., Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HA.v. L.

REv. 1013, 1033-34 (1953) ; Note, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1212 (1955), and is not applied in
some diversity cases, see, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953);

Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948). It has been suggested that the
doctrine is properly applicable where "state-created" rights are in issue. HART &
WECHSLER, op. cit. supra, at 610, 637-78. According to the territorialist theory which
dictated the result in Walton, no American state had jurisdiction to create the right
asserted; that right could be brought into being only by the law of a foreign country.
Is the Erie doctrine applicable where foreign-created, as distinguished from state or
federally created, rights are in issue? More realistically, the right in such a case is
"created" by the state which supplies the choice-of-law rule. See CooH, THE LOGICAL
AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAwS passim (1942).

It has been suggested that

the Erie doctrine should not have been extended to questions of the conflict of laws.
See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 405, 467-69,
502-03 (1955), and authorities cited therein. And, despite current unfavorable intimations, the idea persists that in international conflict-of-laws cases the choice of law should
perhaps be made according to federal standards which would be binding on state courts
as well. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); CHEATHAM, Goom icH, GlSwoLD &
REESE, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 616-17 (4th ed. 1957) ; Cheatham, Federal Control
of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAID. L. REv. 581 (1953) ; Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REv. 717, 723-29 (1957) ;
Note, 41 CoLum. L. REv. 1403 (1941). For cases which suggest the need of federal rules
for international conflicts see, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894) ; cf. Pasos v.

Pan American Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1956); Bergman v. de Sieyes,

170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948); Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242
N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926). See also Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 Am. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939); Note, 47
CoLU . L. REV. 629 (1947). Certainly the idea that Erie rests upon a constitutional
principle, which denies to the federal courts power to supply the rule of decision for
cases which are exclusively within the legislative competence of the states, becomes
attenuated in application to international conflicts cases such as Walton. Cf. Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10, 11, 13 (1940).
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other are fixed by the law of the territorial jurisdiction within which
the wrong is done and the parties are at the time of doing it...
That and that alone is the foundation of their rights.
. . . the only justification for allowing a party to recover when the
cause of action arose in another civilized jurisdiction is a wellfounded belief that it was a cause of action in that place. The right
to recover stands upon that as its necessary foundation. It is part
of the plaintiff's case, and if there is reason for doubt he must allege
and prove it.3
The court of appeals in the Walton case indicated no sympathy with
this vested-rights philosophy. On the contrary, going well beyond any suggestion made in the brief of counsel for the appellant, the late Judge Frank
industriously criticized the rule, established in New York, that the substantive
law of the place of injury invariably governs tort liability, suggesting that
its "unwise and unjust" operation should lead to its re-examination. 4 In
addition, he deplored the New York rule directing the disposition of cases
in which the foreign law is not made to appear, finding that under that rule
the burden of proof was placed upon the plaintiff.5 In announcing the
conclusion to which he felt forced by New York law, Judge Frank, speaking
for the court, bluntly declared that the result was "unjust,"0 for the reason
that, as between the plaintiff, an ex-serviceman temporarily employed in
Saudi Arabia at the time of the injury, and the defendant, a corporation
engaged in extensive business operations there, the defendant was in a far
better position to obtain information as to the law of that country.
It has now been some years since Walter Wheeler Cook discredited
the vested-rights theory as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever
discredit the intellectual product of another. 7 A quarter of a century has
elapsed since one of the most penetrating studies in our literature demonstrated that there can be no defense for a system of conflict of laws which
ignores the content of the foreign law that is designated as controlling.8 Yet
3. 222 U.S. 473, 478-79 (1912).
4. 233 F.2d at 543.

5. Id. at 545. Assuming that under the Erie doctrine, as extended by Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), and Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498
(1941), the court was bound to follow the New York choice-of-law rule, there is still
some room for doubt as to whether it was required to follow the New York practice
with respect to the disposition of the case in which the foreign law is not made to appear.
Cf. Peterson v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 138 F.2d 304 n.3 (8th Cir. 1943). The court of
appeals itself treated this question as one to be decided with reference to FED. R. Civ. P.
43(a), which treats the admissibility of evidence in a way which does not suggest the
kind of uniformity contemplated by the Erie doctrine. This doubt will not be pursued
here, first because the federal rule, as exemplified by the Crosby case, was to the same
effect as the New York rule, and second because the problem to which this paper is
addressed is not peculiar to the federal courts.

6. 233 F.2d at 545.

7. CooK, op. cit. supra note 2.
8. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. Rxv. 173 (1933).
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the spectacle with which we are confronted is that of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, constrained by the law of one of our more sophisticated states, announcing a decision dictated by the vested-rights theory,
treating the law of the forum as displaced by a foreign law of (presumably)
unknown content-and publicly holding its nose in the act because of the
injustice of the result. Such a phenomenon warrants further investigation,
especially since, as the inquiry proceeds, one finds that what is involved is
one of the most fundamental and perplexing problems in the conflict of laws.
II.

ENGLISHa BACKGROUND

If a case roughly comparable to Walton had been brought in an English
common-law court in the early stages of the development of English law, the
result would have been similar to that in the Walton case: the action would
have been dismissed on the ground that the court lacked "cognizance" of
torts committed abroad.9 By the seventeenth century, however, the commonlaw courts began to take jurisdiction of foreign causes, utilizing the quaint
device of permitting the pleader, after truly stating the foreign locality of
the event, to add a fictitious, nontraversable allegation that the foreign
locality was in England. 10
The forbearance of the common-law courts to exercise jurisdiction over
foreign causes was fundamentally related to the character of the English
jury as a body which judged according to its own knowledge of the facts."
In addition, however, as Sack has clearly shown, it was related to a feeling
that the common law of England-the only law administered in the commonlaw courts-would not furnish the appropriate rule of decision, and that such
cases should be remitted either to the foreign court or to the admiralty, where
a different system of law would be applied. 12 The first of these obstacles
disappeared as the jury was gradually transformed into a body which acted
on the basis of testimony instead of personal knowledge of the facts; and
the assumption of jurisdiction was thus made possible. The second obstacle
remained, confronting the courts with the problem of the law to be applied
A

9. See Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law, in 3

CENTURY OF PROGRESS 342,

LAw:

344-45 (1937). The effect was to remit the complainant,

though a British subject, to the foreign court for his redress; but, if relief could not
be obtained abroad, the chancellor might, in appropriate cases, authorize extrajudicial
relief by way of reprisal or distraint. Id. at 352-53. Possibly some such cases might come
within the jurisdiction of the court of the lord constable and marshal-the so-called "court
of chivalry." Ibid. Later (in the sixteenth century) the admiralty assumed a broad
jurisdiction of matters arising beyond as well as upon the seas; the law applied in that
court being the "general" law of nations, the maritime law, the law merchant, and the
civil law. Id. at 355.
10. The leading case is Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.
1774). See Sack, supra note 9, at 370-71.
11. See id. at 345.

12. Id. at 361-66.

HeinOnline -- 58 Colum. L. Rev. 967 1958

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

in the adjudication of the foreign cause. In search of evidence of precocious
sophistication, scholars have unearthed some strikingly early instances of willingness to receive and apply foreign law. 13 In general, though, it seems a
fair assumption that the common-law courts, habituated to the application
of their own law and flush with victory over their civilian rivals in admiralty,
proceeded for a while in the application of the common law as a matter
of course. 14 However this may be, it is clear that when the courts came to
take cognizance of foreign law in tort cases, they did so by way of justification
to the defendant alone. 15 Indeed, the English rule to this day is that the
plaintiff may recover in a tort action predicated on foreign facts if, and
only if, the act would have been actionable as a tort if done in England,
provided only that it was not "justifiable" under the law of the place where
it was done. 16 Moreover, it seems to be the settled practice in England in all
cases that a party wishing to rely on foreign law has the burden of establishing that law to the satisfaction of the court. Otherwise the court will
simply apply English law. 17 We may be reasonably sure, therefore, that if a
case similar to Walton had been brought in an English common-law court
at any time after those courts assumed jurisdiction over foreign torts, the
13. See id. at 379-80.

14. See id. at 361, 378-79. See also Dutton v. Howell, 1 Show. P.C. 24, 30, 1 Eng.
Rep. 17, 21 (H.L. 1693). The earliest recognition that foreign law might be applied in
a tort action, apparently, is Blad's Case, 3 Swanst. 603, 36 Eng. Rep. 991 (P.C. 1673).
As late as 1774, when Lord Mansfield definitively established the jurisdiction of the
common-law courts over torts committed abroad, counsel for the defendant professed
uncertainty as to whether and how the foreign law could be invoked. Mostyn v. Fabrigas,
1 Cowp. 161, 165, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1024 (K.B. 1774). See also Spanish Ambassador
v. Buntish & Pointes, 2 Bulstrode 322, 80 Eng. Rep. 1156 (K.B. 1615); 2 KAmEs,
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY

266-67 (3d ed. 1778).

15. See Blad's Case, supra note 14, at 604, 36 Eng. Rep. at 992; Mostyn v. Fabrigas,
supra note 14, at 175, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1029 (Lord Mansfield).
16. The Halley, L.R. 2 P.C. 193 (1868); Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q.B. 231;
DicEY, CONFLICT OF LAWs 940-78 (7th ed. 1958); HANCOCK, TORTS IN THE CONFLICT

5-12 (1942).
17. So, at least, say the leading text-writers. See, e.g.,

OF LAWS

CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTER-

LAW 129-32 (5th ed. 1957) ; DicEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1107-16 (7th ed. 1958) ;
GRAvEsoN, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 347 (3d ed. 1955). For rhetorical purposes I am
inclined to accept their conclusion although the supporting cases are far from satisfactory.
The earliest clear reference to the problem appears to have been in Male v. Roberts,
3 Esp. 163, 170 Eng. Rep. 574 (C.P. 1800). In Mure v. Kaye, 4 Taunt. 34, 128 Eng.
Rep. 239 (C.P. 1811), an action for false imprisonment based on an arrest in Scotland,
Lord Mansfield and his brethren indicated considerable uncertainty as to whether it was
incumbent on either party, or both parties, to plead the foreign law. In the end, without
resolving that question, the court disposed of the case according to the law of England.
The principle declared in the texts was squarely affirmed in an obscure nisi prius decision.
Brown v. Gracey, reported in Note (a) to Lacon v. Higgins, Dowl. & Ry. N.P. 38, 41,
171 Eng. Rep. 910, 911 (1822). In King of Spain v. Machado, 4 Russ. 225, 239, 38
Eng. Rep. 790, 795 (Ch. 1827), a Spanish document, in the absence of evidence of Spanish
law, was construed "according to the natural import of its terms." The principle was
reaffirmed, on the authority of Brown v. Gracey, supra, in Lloyd v. Guibert, L.R. 1 Q.B.
115, 129 (Ex. Ch. 1865); but this was the sheerest dictum: the law which the court
held applicable was pleaded, and taken to be as alleged. Nouvelle Banque de l'Union v.
Ayton, 7 T.L.R. 377 (C.A. 1891), is an unsatisfactorily reported case in which the court
approved the application of English law on an issue of negotiability upon an unsuccessful
effort to establish the foreign law. At most it affirms a presumption of identity between
the law of the forum and the foreign law in matters relating to common types of
NATIONAL
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action would not have been dismissed because the foreign law did not appear.
The case would simply have been adjudicated according to the law of England.
The English practice, whereby the law of the forum furnishes the rule
of decision until it is displaced by a different law with a greater claim to
recognition, brought forward by a party wishing to take advantage of the
difference, seems normal and natural. It has something of the quality of
soundness which one associates with a house which has been designed skillfully in terms of its relationship to the physical characteristics of its site. This
is a rule of law admirably adapted to the facts of its environment. Lawyers
and judges are ordinarily schooled in their own domestic law. Day in and
day out they think, advise, and argue and dispose of cases in terms of that
law. They develop familiarity with its provisions and sometimes expertness
and even insights concerning it. They are prone, at least according to a
widely held belief, to overlook the significance of foreign facts and to proceed
in accordance with local law in many instances in which attention to the
foreign law would have produced a different result.18 The intrusion of foreign
law is an unsettling departure from routine, involving even under ideal conditions some encounter with the unfamiliar, some departure from usual procedures, some additional burden; and there are situations in which the
degree of unfamiliarity and the burden of understanding can become oppressive. To say that there is a strong presumption favoring the application
of the law of the forum until good cause is shown why it should not be applied
is to give prescriptive form to an observation of behavior which has something
in common with Newton's laws of inertia.
There is a wide gulf between the English position and that of New York
as interpreted by the court of appeals in the Walton case. In contrast to the
English practice, that of New York appears quite artificial. It requires
lawyers and judges to think and act in ways different from those to which
they are disposed by training, habit, and inclination. A New York lawyer may
commercial instruments. In The Parchim, [1918] A.C. 157, English sales law was applied
to determine ownership of cargo in a prize case in the absence of proof of foreign law,

on the ground that there was no reasonable alternative; but the court also noted that the
law applied was based "on mercantile usages common in their general substance and
operation to the merchants of all nations." Id. at 160. Dynamit Actien-Gesellschaft v.
Rio Tinto Co., [1918] A.C. 260, 292, contains expressions supporting the principle,
id. at 295, 301; but it is difficult to believe that the court would have applied German
law, even if proved, to determine the validity of a contract under the Trading With the
Enemy Act. Finally, in an annulment proceeding, in the absence of proof of French law,
it was assumed that the grounds for annulment had the effect of rendering the marriage
voidable only, as in English law, with the result that the plaintiff wife was held domiciled
in France and the court had no jurisdiction. De Reneville v. de Reneville, [1948]
1 All E.R. 56 (C.A. 1947).
The Scottish practice appears to be the same. See M'Elroy v. M'Allister, 1949 S.L.T.
139, discussed in Ehrenzweig, Alternative Actionability in the Conflict of Laws of
Enterprise Liability, 63 Jusm. RFv. 39 (1951). For a comment by Professor T. B. Smith

see id. at 49 n.36.
18. See Kales, Presumption of the ForeignLaw, 19 HAv. L. Rnv. 401 (1906). For
an illustration of this point see In re Estate of Daniel, 208 Minn. 420, 294 N.W. 465
(1940).
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know his law of torts quite thoroughly, but the knowledge will not avail him
if he does not also know that in an obscure section of the digest entitled
"What Law Governs," or in a subject called "conflict of laws" which he
may not have studied in law school, there is a rule which refers questions
of liability in tort to the law of the place of the wrong. Whereas in the
English practice the choice-of-law rule is permissive and calculated to further
the ends of justice by allowing the interested party to invoke the protection
of foreign law, in New York the choice-of-law rule has attained the status
of a categorical imperative: the foreign law is an essential ingredient of the
cause of action or defense, without which there is nothing on which the
court can act. Whereas the English lawyer may safely assume that he may
rely on the ordinary law of the land until he is notified to the contrary, the
New York lawyer is expected to be constantly alert to the significance of
foreign facts, expert in his knowledge of those rules which designate (with a
precision to which students of conflict of laws can testify) the appropriate
foreign law, and endowed with either omniscience or unlimited enterprise
with respect to knowledge or ascertainment of the proper foreign law. In
England, I suppose, the lawyer who puts forward the suggestion that a consideration of foreign law would be advantageous to his client is entitled to be
regarded as a rather ingenious fellow who has accomplished something of
a coup; in New York the lawyer who fails to note the importance of foreign
law is entitled to be regarded as a blunderhead. As one indication of how far
the New York conception of the choice-of-law rule can be carried, it may be
noted that the fact that courts frequently decide cases involving foreign facts
according to local law, in the absence of any suggestion to the contrary by
either party, has been viewed with alarm' 9-- almost as if the courts were in
the habit of deciding cases without reference to a controlling local statute.
How did such an attitude come about, and how have other courts dealt with
the problem?
III. THE PROBLEm FURTHER CONSIDERED
A major source of the difficulty and confusion attending the problem
in this country is the notion, inherited from the English practice, that foreign
law must be treated as fact for all purposes. In due course we shall note
the familiar procedural difficulties which have resulted from that notion.
The point to be made here is more basic. By virtue of the notion that foreign
law is fact, the whole problem of pleading and proving foreign law, including
the problem of what is to be done when the law of the state referred to by
the choice-of-law rule is not invoked, has in effect been ceded by the domain
of conflict of laws to the domain of evidence. Writers on conflict of laws
19. See Kales, mepra note 18, at 401. See also notes 123-24 infra.
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have concentrated their attention upon the rules for choice of law and, on
the basis that foreign law is to be treated as fact, have in the main left
questions relating to pleading and proof of that law to the experts on
evidence.2 0 Those questions are of such obvious interest, however, to students
of conflict of laws that most writers on that subject have been impelled to
include some treatment of them, if only for informational purposes. They
have been hard pressed to find place for this treatment in the organization
of their works. Story solved the problem by the rather crude expedient of
including the subject in a chapter entitled "Evidence and Proofs," 21 - thereby
setting a precedent from which there have been few departures. 22 The chapter
was basically concerned with the dichotomy between "substance" and "procedure"-that is, with the distinction between those matters which are governed
by the proper foreign law and those which are governed by the procedural
law of the forum. Questions relating to pleading and proving foreign law
had no very logical relation to that distinction; but the arrangement was
justified by the superficial fact that questions of pleading and proving foreign
law also concerned "procedure," or "evidence and proof."
The relinquishment of jurisdiction over these questions by writers on
conflict of laws has had an unfortunate effect. The problem has been defined
as one of pleading and proof alone. The conditions upon which a solution is
to be worked out have been given. The resources to be employed in working
out a solution are those available to experts in evidence, as such. No question
is to be raised concerning the theoretical basis for the invocation of foreign
law, nor the function of a choice-of-law rule; all such questions have presumably been settled by the experts on conflicts. Nothing remains but for
the experts on evidence to bring their distinctive resources to bear. This
artificial and unduly confining definition of the problem has hampered efforts
to find a satisfactory solution and has subtly misdirected many a critical
20. See THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
257 (1898); McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. REv. 296 (1952). One of the
more extensive treatments is to be found in 2 WiGMom, EvIDENCE §§ 564, 566 (3d ed.
1940) ; 3 id. § 690; 4 id. § 1271; 5 id. §§ 1633, 1674, 1684; 7 id. § 1953; 9 id. §§ 2536, 2558,
2573. The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act is classified as an "Evidence
Act," and its general adoption was urged by the American Bar Association's Committee
on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence. See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2573 (3d ed.
1940). The problem is also treated in MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 801-06 (1942),
and in UNIFORM RULES OF EVI)ENCE 9-12. See also note 27 infra.
21. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 651-66 (6th ed. 1865).
22. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 584-625 (1934); BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 621.1-625.2 (1935); CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD & REESE, CASES ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS 351-417 (4th ed. 1957): DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1107-16 (7th ed.
1958); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 226-59 (3d ed. 1949); HARPER, TAINTER, CARNAHAN & BROWN, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 2 (1950); LORENZEN, CASES ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS 263-300 (6th ed. 1951) ; STUMBERG, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 171
(1956) ; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 134-78 (2d ed. 1951). An exception is JOHNSON,

CONFLICT OF LAWS (1933), in which the phenomenon of foreign law in local courts
is given extended treatment in the first chapter. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS,
SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1956), contains no readings, but only a list
of references, on invocation and ascertainment of the foreign law. Id. at 228.
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effort. 23 Even Profess6r Nussbaum, who has contributed perhaps the most
enlightened and helpful discussion of the problem, felt constrained to accept
the existing system of conflict of laws as a limiting datum: "To the extent
that Conflicts rules have evolved judicially or otherwise they must be obeyed
in the same way as other rules of law. ' 24 Only in a final footnote did he
remark that his proposed solution "furnishes another point against the
vested right doctrine." 25 Thus, almost involuntarily, he achieved a nearly
unique distinction in venturing to suggest a doubt as to the conditions upon
which the problem is stated; but he did not develop the point, and none of
the great modern critics of traditional conflict-of-laws theory has addressed
2
himself to the fundamental theoretical problems involved. 6
The problem, as it has been developed in this context, has been found
to consist of several more or less distinct components :27 (1) Must foreign
23. Recently a bold bid has been made for jurisdiction of the problem by the domain
of comparative law. The pioneer casebook in this field contains a far more extensive
coverage than any casebook on conflict of laws. SCHLESINGER, CASES ON COMPARATIVE
LAW 32-139 (1950). Whatever advantages such an arrangement might have, there
seems no reason to expect that the experts in this field will be better able than those
in evidence to find a satisfactory solution, nor any more free from the doctrinal presuppositions in the context of which the problem is presented. On the contrary, whereas
the evidence experts may be presumed to be neutral in such matters, the comparativists,
by virtue of their special competence in and familiarity with foreign legal systems, may
bring to the task a bias in favor of foreign law which will not necessarily be conducive
to a sound solution.
24. Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1044
(1941).
25. Id. at 1044 n.141. At the same time he disclaimed sympathy with the local-law
theory, which he interpreted in a way which would doubtless give offense to the founders
of that theory.
26. See Cooic, op. cit. supra note 2; Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law
Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and
the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE LJ. 736 (1924).
27. In the following brief discussion of the development of the problem in this
country, detailed documentation of familiar propositions would serve no useful purpose.
Instead, I list here some of the sources which, in addition to those cited in notes 20
and 22 supra, have been particularly useful.
The earlier cases are helpfully assembled and analyzed in Annots., 34 L.R.A. (n.s.)
261 (1911), 67 L.R.A. 33 (1904). An influential early analysis is Kales, supra note 18.
Another early treatment, perhaps the most extensive in a treatise on conflict of laws, is in
2 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§771-82(b) (3d ed. 1905).
Between World War I and the approval of the Uniform Act in 1936 the following
discussions appeared: Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts Under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, 12 MINN. L. REv. 439 (1928) ; von Moschzisker, Presumptions as to
Foreign Law, 11 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1926) ; Wachtell, The Proof of Foreign Law in
American Courts, 69 U.S.L. Rgv. 527, 580 (1935); Comment, 17 CALIF. L. REV. 417
(1929) ; Notes, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1019 (1933), 39 HARV. L. REv. 378 (1926) ; Comment,
30 MicH. L. Rmv. 747 (1932); 20 COLUm. L. REv. 476 (1920).
Discussions since the promulgation of the Uniform Act include: CAL. LAW REvisION
'N, REcOMmENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE LAW OF
FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1957); N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, NINTH ANN. REP. 271 (1943);
Com

Busch, When Law is Fact, 24 FORDHAm L. REv. 646 (1956); Hartwig, Congressional
Enactment of the Uniform Judicial Notice Act, 40 MIcH. L. REv. 174 (1941) ; Husserl,
The Foreign Fact Element in Conflict of Laws, 26 VA. L. REv. 243, 453 (1940) ; Jones,
International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62
YALE L.J. 515 (1953); Keeffe, Landis & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial
Notice, 2 STAN. L. REv. 664 (1950) ; Kuhn, Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 39 Am. J.
INT'L L. 86 (1945); Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 Am. J. ComP.
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law be pleaded, and, if so, with what particularity? (2) Must foreign law
be proved, and, if so, in what manner? (3) Who is to decide the issue as
to the tenor of the foreign law? (4) Is the determination of the issue as to
foreign law reviewable on appeal?
The basic answers to those questions followed inexorably from the
postulate that foreign law is fact: (1) Foreign law must be pleaded like
other facts. (2) Foreign law must be proved in conformity with the law of
evidence. (3) The issue as to foreign law is to be decided by the trier of fact.
(4) The determination of an issue as to foreign law is not reviewable by a
court having jurisdiction to review questions of law only.
These answers, particularly the second and third, proved troublesome
from the standpoint of the fair and efficient administration of justice. The
requirement that the jury must determine any issue as to the rule of decision
provided by the foreign law, though a manifest absurdity, may not have been
so troublesome in actual practice as might be supposed, since the courts,
acting on their own initiative, early devised some limitations for the jury's
function. 28 There can be no doubt, however, that the requirement that foreign
law be proved in conformity with all the technical rules of evidence was
generally a burdensome, expensive, time-consuming, and pointless annoyance. 29 For such ills a remedy was found in the pharmacopoeia of evidence:
foreign law might be fact, but it was fact susceptible of judicial notice. While
the courts had with near unanimity refused to take judicial notice of foreign
law on their own initiative, they could be authorized or required to do so
by statute. Accordingly, attention was concentrated on the formulation of
judicial notice statutes, which were widely enacted.30 In general, the effect
of such statutes has surely been salutary.
In order to clear the way for consideration of the more difficult problems,
L. 60 (1954) ; Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018

(1941); Saxe, New York Extends Judicial Notice to Matters of Law, 28 J. Am. Jun.
Soc'y 86 (1944) ; Sommerich & Busch, The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign
Law, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 125 (1953) ; Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice
and Proof, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 23 (1957); Note, 32 Mass. L.Q. May 1947, p. 20; Comment, 42 MICH. L. REv. 509 (1943).
The Walton case is noted in 43 IowA L. REv. 125 (1957); 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 377
(1957).

28. See STORY, CONFLICT oF LAws §§ 638, 638a (6th ed. 1865) 2 WHARTON, CONFLICT
LAWS §§ 773, 773a (3d ed. 1905). A particularly objectionable aspect of this requirement was that the judge was obliged to hold the foreign law controlling even though he
did not know what the finding as to its tenpr would be. See Cavers, A Critique of the
Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933).
29. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 308-09; note 32 infra. The suggestion that
cross-examination of expert witnesses is often indispensable to the ascertainment of foreign-country law, see Sommerich & Busch, supra note 27, at 158 n.137; Stern, supra note
27, at 44, can be met by giving the judge discretion to require formal proof when he is
not satisfied as to the reliability or authenticity of the information made available.
30. Some early statutes are referred to in 2 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAws § 781a (3d
ed. 1905). See also 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2573 (3d ed. 1940). The Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act, approved in 1936, has been adopted in twenty-six states. Outstanding among modern statutes not modeled closely on the Uniform Act are CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 1875; MAss. GEi. LAws ch. 233, § 70 (1932) ; N.Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT § 344-a.
OF
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let us state, and then put aside, certain propositions concerning which little
controversy can be anticipated:
1. When, for the purpose of finding a rule of decision, a court turns
its attention to foreign law, it is desirable to have the inquiry proceed free
from any restriction imposed by the formalities or the exclusionary rules
of the law of evidence. Indeed, so clear is this proposition, and so general
its applicability, that one wonders why the framers of the Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act limited their corrective measure to the laws of
other states of the Union, withholding it from application to the laws of
foreign countries. The same arguments which justify informal access to all
available sources of information where the laws of a sister state are concerned
at least equally justify the same procedure with respect to the laws of foreign
countries.
2. When, for the purpose of finding a rule of decision, it becomes
necessary to resolve an issue as to the content, tenor, or construction of
foreign law, the issue should be determined by the court rather than by the
jury. Again, this is a proposition which is applicable equally to the laws of
sister states and to the laws of foreign countries. One might even suggest
that where the foreign legal system is alien to the common law there are
additional reasons why the issue should be determined by the court.
3. Probably, it is also desirable that the determination of an issue as
to the rule of decision provided by the foreign law should be reviewable by
appellate courts; but this is in part a question of appellate policy which should
not depend upon characterization of the question as one of lav or of fact
and which ought not to be casually disposed of in the context of a discussion
of the conflict of laws. 31
It was primarily for the purpose of conforming the law to these propositions, and thus changing the original answers to the second, third, and fourth
questions, that the judicial notice statutes were passed. 32 But these proposi31. For a discussion of the somewhat similar question as to review of federal district
court determinations of state law see Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme
Court and the Erie Doctrine h; Diversity Cases, 67 YALz L.J. 187, 215-18 (1957).
32. According to the Commissioners' Prefatory Note, the Uniform Act "was proposed
in order.., to correct two outworn rules of the common law. The first was the rule forbidding judicial notice of American law in sister states of the United States. The second
was the rule that the decision upon such laws should be a question of fact for the jury, not
of law for the judge." 9A U.L.A. 318 (1957). The objective on the first score is somewhat
clarified by the provisions of the act and the section-by-section notes of the commissioners.
Section 2 provides that the court may inform itself of the laws to be noticed in such manner
as it may deem proper. Section 3 provides that the determination of foreign law shall be
made by the court and not the jury, and shall be reviewable. Although the act does not
otherwise extend to laws of foreign countries, § 5 provides that the issue as to such laws is
for the court. See also Wachtell, spra note 27, at 580.
The reason for the New York Judicial Council's recommendation of § 344-a of the
Civil Practice Act was primarily the expense and burden of complying with the rules of
evidence. N.Y. JuDIciAL COUCCL, NINTH AxN. REP. 271 (1943) ; see Saxe, supra note
27, at 87. The Massachusetts act "did away with 'the time-honored farce of submitting
questions of foreign law to the jury as questions of fact.'" Note, 32 Mass. L.Q. May
1947, p. 20 (1947). See also McCormick, supra note 20.
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tions do not resolve all the problems that are subsumed under the general
head of pleading and proof of foreign law. The draftsmen were confronted
with a series of practical questions. They might have dealt with each one
separately on the merits, stating their conclusions as we have done in our
three propositions, without appealing to any general principle. Instead, they
found in judicial notice a concept which conveniently rationalized the desired
result with respect to the more pressing questions, and adopted that rationale
although it implied answers to other questions which had not weighed heavily
in their deliberations and which had certainly not been analyzed adequately
and considered on their merits.
The partially hidden questions begin to come to light when we recognize
that in discussing the requirement that foreign law be proved we have thus
far discussed only the procedure whereby information as to the foreign law
is brought to the attention of the court. We have agreed that this procedure
should be informal and unencumbered by the rules of evidence. We have not
discussed the question: when and for what purpose is it necessary to bring
information as to the foreign law to the attention of the court? We have
considered the manner in which foreign law is to be established; we have not
considered the consequences of failure (by a party not yet identified) to
establish it.
The point will become clearer when we recognize that thus far we have
not discussed at all the first of the four questions: must foreign law be pleaded?
There is little to indicate that the formal requirement of pleading, like the
formal requirement of proof, gave rise to material difficulties and hence motivated the enactment of the judicial notice statutes. Yet, just as the treatment
of foreign law as fact had dictated the conclusion that it must be pleaded like
other facts, so the principle of judicial notice, by which "sister state law is
put upon the same footing as the forum law, ' 33 tends to require the conclusion
that there is no more necessity for pleading foreign law than there is for
pleading domestic law.
But such an answer fails to provide a complete, or workable, or acceptable
solution to the problem. The rule that foreign law must be pleaded is a
deceptively complex and incomplete statement. It says that in a certain type
of situation somebody is expected to take a certain procedural step. It is
reasonably clear that one kind of situation (among others) calls for this step:
the facts disclose a connection with a foreign state such that, according to
a choice-of-law rule of the forum, the foreign law is the source of the rule
of decision. The rule says something about the manner in which the action
is to be taken: it is to be relatively formal, a statement in the pleadings of
33. UNIFORM JUDICIAL NoTIcE
9A U.L.A. 318, 319 (1957).

OF FoREIG

LAW AcT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note,
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at least the substance of the foreign law. Something is said, also, about the
appropriate time for this action: it is to be taken, normally, at the outset of
the proceedings, at the time when the issues for trial are defined, although
under modern systems of pleading the possibility of curing the omission by
amendment at a later time is not excluded. It is not at all clear, however,
who is expected to take this action. We may, of course, infer that it is one
of the parties, rather than the court, since it is the parties who are responsible
for the contents of the pleadings. But we cannot be sure which of the parties
is meant. What amounts, perhaps, to the same thing, the rule does not reveal
the consequences of noncompliance. Possibly what is meant is that the obligation may rest upon the one party or the other as the occasion may require;
but this still falls short of answering our question. Without attempting at
this point to state all the consequences of failure to plead the applicable foreign
law, let us simply note the most important ambiguity in the rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to plead the applicable foreign law, if challenged by the defendant, might mean: (1) that the sufficiency of the complaint
as stating a cause of action is to be determined by the law of the forum, and
that the plaintiff will not be permitted to rely on any advantage which the
foreign law might afford; or (2) that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action and should be dismissed, since the foreign law is an essential ingredient
of the cause of action.
Assuming that the question as to the failure of the defendant to plead
the foreign law is reached, a similar pair of alternatives can be constructed
with respect to the consequences of his failure to comply with the rule. The
requirement that foreign law be proved shares the same ambiguity. This
ambiguity cannot be resolved by reference to the requirement that foreign
law be pleaded and proved, nor by the underlying premise that foreign law
is fact. Nor is it obviated by the new doctrine that the court will take
judicial notice of foreign law. Finally, it is not one which can be resolved
by a mere allocation of the burden of proceeding to the one party or the
other. Its resolution tends to rest upon preconceptions concerning the function of the choice-of-law rule; hence any adequate discussion of the problem
must be concerned with fundamental questions of conflict-of-laws theory which
have been decidedly neglected in this context.
It is not at all clear what change, if any, was intended to be effected
by the substitution of the concept of judicial notice for the requirement that
foreign law be pleaded. In the discussion of the question of proof, it was
possible for us to set down, as a matter not likely to be seriously disputed,
the proposition that judicial inquiry into the content and tenor of foreign
law should not be fettered by the rules of evidence. There is temptation to
make a similar statement about the formality of pleading foreign law. Al-
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though there is little evidence that this formal requirement led to substantial
injustice and it is unlikely that it would do so under modern systems of
pleading, we might say that there is no point in insisting on formality for its
own sake, that there may be latent possibilities of injustice in any rigid requirement, and that informal methods of attaining the ends sought would
be preferable. Immediately, however, we encounter difficulties. It is not
clear what the functions of the requirement were. In discussing the manner
in which foreign law is invoked in the first instance, as distinguished from the
manner in which its tenor is to be established, we are squarely confronted
with the question of the consequences of failure by the proper party to make
his move at the proper time.
Treatments of this subject tend to gloss over the ambiguity as to the
consequences of failure to plead and prove foreign law by prefacing the
requirement with an equally ambiguous indication that it is operative when
foreign law becomes "material," or "relevant." 34 But when does foreign
law become material? When a party invokes it in aid of a cause of action
or a defense, or whenever a foreign factor in the case brings the matter
within the purview of a choice-of-law rule? What are the consequences of
failure to plead and prove the foreign law, and what change in those consequences, if any, is contemplated by the substitution of the concept of judicial
notice for the requirement of pleading and proof? We shall be in a better
position to consider these questions when we have examined the judicial
notice statutes in some detail.

IV.

ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITIONS: THE PRESUMPTIONS

The trial of Walton v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co. opened with the following
remarks by the presiding judge:
Gentlemen, in examining the pleadings, I note that this is a
claim based on negligence which arose in Saudi Arabia.
Will there be any conflict between you as to what the law of
Saudi Arabia is ?35
There had been no reference to the law of Saudi Arabia in either the
complaint or the answer. But for this remark by Judge Bicks, it is conceivable that the case might have gone to trial on the tacit assumption that
New York law governed (though that seems hardly likely with so exotic a
locus delicti as Saudi Arabia). Had that been the case and had a final
34. See, e.g., 3 BEALE, CONFLiCT OF LAws § 622A.1 (1935) ; Committee on Improvement in the Law of Evidence, Report, 63 A.B.A. REP. 570, 593 (1938); Kales, supra
note 18; von Moschzisker, supra note 27; 20 CoLum. L. RFv. 476, 477 (1920) ; Cf. MASS.
GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 70 (1932).
35. Brief for Appellant, app. p. 10.
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judgment been entered for the plaintiff without appeal, the legal consequences
of the failure to plead and prove, or otherwise take account of, the law of the
place of injury would have been nil. The losing party would not be in a
position to take advantage of the oversight. Students of conflict of laws
might observe that counsel for the defendant had missed a singularly good
opportunity to achieve a different result. They might even go so far as to
feel that the defendant had been inadequately represented. It would be rather
extreme of them, however, to feel that the case had been "wrongly" decided,
or to deplore, with Kales, the disregard of the "controlling" law. 0
On the other hand, the oversight might have been discovered by the
defendant before the case had been finally closed. Thus he might attempt
to raise the question of the applicability of the foreign law for the first time
on appeal, or in a motion for new trial; or he might simply have waited until
the close of the plaintiff's evidence, and then moved for dismissal or for a
directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the
foreign law.
These speculations raise the question: in what manner, at what time,
and by whom is the point to be made that the case is one involving a foreign
factor sufficient to raise a question as to what law governs? Whose responsibility is it to notice the fact that the case is a conflict-of-laws case, to be
handled in a special manner-a case in which foreign law may be material?
Judge Bicks's remark, which was not criticized by either party or by the
court of appeals, furnishes at least a partial answer. Provided the suggestion
is timely, it may be made informally, even by the court on its own motion.8 7
Judge Bicks assumed, since the complaint disclosed that the accident had
happened in Saudi Arabia and since the familiar choice-of-law rule points
to the law of the place of injury as controlling, that Saudi Arabian law
would be material. He assumed, further, that the parties had inquired into
the Saudi Arabian law and were prepared either to agree on its tenor or to
litigate the question in some appropriate manner. He assumed, also, that
it was a good idea to settle at the outset of the litigation any question as to
what the relevant law of Saudi Arabia was.
Thus the suggestion that foreign law was material came in such a way
as to cause the plaintiff no prejudice or surprise. In reply to the court's
opening remarks, counsel for the plaintiff stated that he was prepared to
proceed on the basis of common-law negligence, on the theory that if liability
could be established according to "rudimentary principles" of tort law he
36. Kales, mipra note 18, at 401.
37. Judge Bicks's ruling that the foreign law need not be pleaded, Brief for
Appellant, app. p. 12, is at variance with other statements as to the law in the federal
courts. See Empresa Agricola Chimada Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 57 F. Supp.
649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) ; Busch, supra note 27, at 655. But see Siegelman v. Cunard White
Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1955).
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was entitled to recover without reference to the law of the place of injury.
Judge Bicks, without the aid of memoranda from counsel for either side,
ruled that "the burden will be upon the plaintiff to establish as a fact the
law of Saudi Arabia and absent such proof the plaintiff will not make out
a case, and will require the complaint to be dismissed." 38 Counsel for the
plaintiff reiterated his contention that it was not necessary for him to prove
the Saudi Arabian law, adding that in his opinion there was no law or legal
system in that country. Thereupon the court and the parties proceeded to
make a pro forma record, for the purpose of appeal, and the preordained
directed verdict for the defendant followed.
The polar alternative to the course followed by the court would have
been to rule that the law of the forum was to be applied as the only law
before the court until such time as some party, wishing to rely on a differing
provision of the foreign law, should invoke the foreign law. 39 The choice
between these two courses is basic to our discussion. Before we consider it,
however, we may give some attention to other alternatives which were available, according to at least some authorities, in the generalized situation. Three
have been recognized:
(1) The court might, because of the "inherent justice" of the claim
asserted, presume that the rudimentary principles of law necessary to support
it obtain in all civilized countries, and act upon the assumption that it would
be enforced in the foreign country in question;
(2) The court might presume that the law of the foreign country in
question is the same as the law of the forum, whether the relevant law of the
forum is found in the common law or in statutes;
(3) The court might presume that the law of the foreign country is the
same as the common law (but not the statutes) of the forum; but this
presumption is usually indulged only where the foreign country's legal
system is based on the English common law.
These three alternatives rest on a common theoretical basis. Like the
course followed by the court in Walton, they are based on the assumption
that the foreign law, whether or not invoked by one of the parties as a basis
for his claim or defense, becomes material as soon as it is apparent that the
foreign factor which is the fulcrum of the choice-of-law rule is present. Under
each of these three, the consequence of failure to plead and prove the foreign
law is not that the case will be determined by the law of the forum (as such),
but that it will be determined by a quite possibly fictitious construct of the
designated foreign law. At the same time, all three as a practical matter tend
to produce the same result that would be reached if the rule were simply
that the law of the forum applies until the proper foreign law is established
by the interested party.
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The first presumption, judging by experience as reflected in the cases,

does not commend itself as a particularly comprehensive or workable solution of the problem. Mr. Justice Holmes did not think that the right of the
employee to recover in the Crosby case was made clear by any "rudimentary"
principles ;40 nor did the court of appeals think that such principles could
sustain the plaintiff in the Walton case. 41 The line dividing those things
42
which are rudimentary from those which are not seems entirely subjective.
In the two leading cases on the defense of infancy in actions on foreign con-

tracts, 43 the presumption concerning rudimentary principles common to
civilized countries was not mentioned. But the glaring inconsistency in each
of those decisions, in requiring the defendant to establish the foreign law in
order to make his defense while not requiring the plaintiff to refer to foreign
law in order to make out a prima facie case, is explainable only on the basis
of such a presumption-and then only if it is understood that the difference
between rudimentary principles and subtle refinements is quite arbitrary.
The third presumption, that the foreign law is the same as the common
law of the forum, produced bizarre results in those cases where the common
law of the forum had been changed by statute. By a type of coincidence which
became more and more improbable as time went on, it might happen that this
device resulted in the application of what in truth was the law of the foreign
state. At times, however, the presumption resulted in the application of a
4
law which was in force in no state having any connection with the problem.

38. Brief for Appellant, app. p. 14.

39. See notes 104-37 infra and accompanying text.
40. 222 U.S. at 480.
41. 233 F.2d at 545. A half century earlier Kales had assumed that a court would
not require proof that the foreign law provides a remedy for personal injuries caused by
negligence. Kales, supmra note 18, at 409. And in 1914 the same court of appeals had
allowed recovery by a passenger on a French vessel for an assault committed by an
employee of the defendant, without proof of French law, remarking that it would be
almost an insult to a civilized country to assume that its law does not allow recovery
in such a situation. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Rivers, 211 Fed. 294, 298
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 232 U.S. 727 (1914). Such a case would seem to present at
least as much doubt as Walton concerning the universality of the measure of damages
and the doctrine of respondeat superior.
42. Thus, in one case the plaintiff declared upon an insurance contract made and
to be performed in Russia, setting forth two causes of action: (1) for the sum agreed
to be paid, and (2) for restitution of premiums on the theory that the defendant had
repudiated. Because the plaintiff did not plead the Russian law, the defendant moved for
dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency. The motion was granted as to the second
cause of action, but denied as to the first. Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 125
Misc. 417, 211 N.Y. Supp. 270 (Sup. Ct. 1925), 39 HARv. L. REv. 378 (1926); cf.
Liachovitzky v. New York Life Ins. Co., 126 Misc. 109, 212 N.Y. Supp. 722 (Sup. Ct.
1925).
43. Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns. R. 190 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1811) (Chancellor Kent);
Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. 163, 170 Eng. Rep. 574 (C.P. 1800) (Lord Eldon).
44. See, e.g., Reidman v. Macht, 98 Ind. App. 124, 183 N.E. 807 (1932), discussed
in Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1038 n.120
(1941) ; Bodine v. Berg, 82 N.J.L. 662, 82 Adt. 901 (Ct Err. & App. 1912), discussed
in 20 COLUm. L. REv. 476, 477 (1920) ; Stokes v. Macken, 62 Barb. 145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1861), discussed in Wachtel, siupra note 27, at 586-87.
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It may be that the result on occasion was to preserve to the plaintiff who had
neglected to establish the foreign law some remedy, in contrast to the complete
loss of remedy he would have suffered if the rule of dismissal applied in the
Walton case had been employed; and so there may have been some apparent
pragmatic justification for the presumption. There is no basis, however, for
assuming that the "just" results reached by it outweighed the capriciously
unjust. In any event, there can be no theoretical justification for such a presumption in this context. When a system for determining which law furnishes
the appropriate rule of decision points to a phantom law which is not in
force in any interested jurisdiction, and perhaps nowhere on earth, the
mechanism is simply running wild.
For the foregoing reasons, it would not be constructive to suggest that
the court in the Walton case might have resorted to one of the three presumptions. The court did not regard the claim of the plaintiff as supported by
rudimentary principles entitled to universal recognition; and, if it had, that
concept is not one which can be objectively applied.45 The presumption that
foreign law is identical with that of the forum is not an improvement on
the application of the law of the forum merely as such. The presumption that
the foreign law coincides with the common law of the forum was not available,
since it is not usually invoked where the foreign system is known to be alien
to the common law; and, in any event, unless the common law applied happens
to be the living law of some interested state, there is nothing to be said in defense of the third presumption.
V.

ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITIONS: JUDICIAL NOTICE

There is also the modern possibility that the court might have taken
judicial notice of the foreign law. At the time the Walton case was tried there
was in force in New York a statute not only authorizing the courts, in their
discretion, to take judicial notice of the law of a foreign country, but specifically providing that the failure of either party to plead foreign law should
not preclude either the trial or appellate court from taking notice of it.4 6 At
no time did the plaintiff suggest such a procedure. The possibility was men45. Recognizing the subjectivity of the rudimentary-principles presumption, Professor
Schlesinger has suggested that research in comparative law may provide the basis for
determining whether a rule or principle is in fact recognized by civilized nations generally.
Schlesinger, Research on the General Principlesof Law Recognized by Civilized Nations,
51 Am. J. INT'L L. 734, 748-49 (1957). This, I suggest, does not promise a satisfactory
solution of our problem. According to Professor Schlesinger's estimate, the project would
require many years, assuming that it is practicable at all. In the end, a compilation of
those principles which are held in common by all civilized countries will bear little
resemblance to the developed law of any modern state; and there is no justification in
the field of conflict of laws for applying a law which is not that of a state interested in
the matter. Having divested ourselves of the general federal common law, we may be
wise not to create, for cases such as these, a general international common law.

46. N.Y. Civ. PRac. AcT § 344-a.
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tioned only when the judge, in the course of delivering his final ruling
against the plaintiff, remarked that he would not take judicial notice of the
law of Saudi Arabia.47 The court of appeals, raising the question apparently
on its own motion, held (1) that on this record it was precluded by New
York law from taking notice of the Saudi Arabian law on appeal, and (2)
that there should not be a remand to permit the parties to assist the court
in taking notice of the foreign law, because the plaintiff had deliberately
refrained from establishing an essential element of his case. 48 All this raises
a puzzling question: to what extent, and in what manner, have the judicial
notice statutes been intended to affect the consequences of failure to bring
the applicable foreign law to the attention of the court?
Dean Wigmore, discussing with approval the Uniform Judicial Notice
of Foreign Law Act, said in 1940: "No one would demand that a Court take
judicial notice of foreign systems of law in foreign languages." 40 Why not?
As we have seen, the primary reasons for the enactment of the judicial notice
statutes apply to the laws of foreign countries as well as to the laws of sister
states.50 Indeed, the Uniform Act itself expressly provides that the law of
a foreign country shall be an issue for the court. 1 Why, then, the persistent
reluctance-which runs throughout the literature-to extend the principle
of judicial notice fully to the law of foreign countries?
The answer must be that the doctrine was thought to perform some
function in addition to those which have been enumerated-some function
which would be unwelcome in the context of foreign-country law. Probably
Dean Wigmore assumed that to apply the doctrine is to impose a duty upon
the court to ascertain the foreign law for itself-a duty which would be
particularly onerous in the context of alien legal systems and unfamiliar
languages. Just why this obligation should follow is not clear. Judicial
notice extends to many matters of fact-some of them quite abstruse-without imposing on the courts the unrealistic burden of informing themselves,
without the aid of counsel, of the matters to be noticed. Perhaps it is the
assimilation of foreign law to domestic law which is responsible for the
assumption that the obligation follows. By the device of judicial notice foreign
47. Brief for Appellant, app. p. 46.

48. 233 F.2d at 546.
49. 9 WIGmORE, EViDENcE § 2573 (3d ed. 1940) ; cf. note, 32 Mass. L.Q., May 1947,
p. 20 (1947). Seven states now provide for judicial notice of the law of foreign countries.
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1875; MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 70 (1956); Miss. CODE ANN.

§ 1761 (1956); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 344-a; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-4 (1953); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-273 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5711 (1955).

In addition, the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
now recommend judicial notice of the law of foreign countries. UNIFORM RULE OF
EVIDENCE 9(2).
50. See notes 20-34 supra and accompanying text.
51. UNIFORM JUDicIrL NoTicE OF FOREIGN LAW AcT

52. See, e.g., 9

WiGoMRE, EVIDENCE

§ 5.

§ 2580 (3d ed. 1940).
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law "is put upon the same footing as the forum law" ;53 the judge knows, or
has a duty to know, the law of the forum; hence he also has a duty to know
the foreign law. Indeed, in some European countries (though by no means
all) the position seems to be that the judges are under a duty to ascertain
and apply the applicable foreign law on their own initiative and by means
54
of their own research.
This assumption of a judicial duty to ascertain the foreign law when
the doctrine of judicial notice applies is rather obscurely related to a tacit
assumption concerning the consequences of failure by the appropriate party
to establish the foreign law. The reasoning seems to be: the choice-of-law
rule commands the application of the foreign law; the judicial notice doctrine
commands the judge to determine the foreign law without proof by the parties,
just as he would determine domestic law; hence, if the parties fail to come
forward with information as to the foreign law, the consequence is that the
court will determine what it is and decide the case accordingly. Thus, failure
by the plaintiff to establish the foreign law which is an essential element of
his case will no longer result either in dismissal or in the application of some
part or all of the law of the forum by way of a presumption that the foreign
law is the same. The court will determine and apply the actual foreign law.
We do not have to depend entirely on inference to establish that judicial
notice statutes proceed on this assumption as to the consequence of failure to
plead and prove the foreign law, and are designed to change that consequence.
The setting in which the judicial notice statutes were introduced may be
recalled. When the Uniform Act was approved in 1936, it was widely taken
for granted that the choice-of-law rule was an ineluctable mandate. The
Restatement5 5 and Beale's treatise06 had pronounced that only the state
referred to by the choice-of-law rule had "jurisdiction" to create the rights
and duties in question. Failure on the part of the plaintiff to establish the
foreign law was failure to establish an essential element of his claim, leading
to dismissal, unless he could be saved by a presumption. Even then, it was
the "foreign law" which was applied, in theory, by way of the various "presumptions" as to the tenor of the foreign law. It seems clear that in some
degree the judicial notice statutes were motivated by revolt against the
artificiality of the presumptions as presumptions of fact. 51
53.

UNIFORMi

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note,

9A U.L.A. 319 (1957).
54. See 1 JOHNSON, CONFLICT

OF LAws 59 n.1 (1933) ; Nussbaum, mspra note 44,
at 1019-20, 1043.
55. See, e.g., RISTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 384 (1934).
56. See 3 BEMLE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 73, at 1969 (1935). Professor Beale was an
advocate of "broad and comprehensive" powers of judicial notice, plainly for the purpose
of insuring the application of the foreign law. 3 id. § 623.1, at 1685.
57. See Gorman v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Ry., 325 Mo. 326, 332-33,

28 S.W.2d 1023, 1024 (1930) ; Wachtell, supra note 27, at 580, 586-87.

HeinOnline -- 58 Colum. L. Rev. 983 1958

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

On rare occasions this purpose of the judicial notice statutes has been
made explicit. Thus the Judicial Council of New York, in proposing the
measure which is now section 344-a of the Civil Practice Act, suggested that
one effect would be to eliminate "injustices" such as the outcome in Cuba
R.R. v. Crosby.58 More specifically, the executive secretary of the Judicial
Council wrote:
Thus, where the plaintiff's cause of action is found to depend wholly
upon the law of a foreign country and counsel has inadvertently failed
to prove such law at the trial, the appellate court is now permitted to
take judicial notice of the law of the foreign country and dispose
of the controversy on its merits.
If [the Crosby] . .. situation should arise in New York, under the
new statute the New York Court of Appeals may now merely ask
counsel to brief the law of Cuba on the particular point in question
or ascertain such law itself, rendering judgment for the plaintiff if
it is found that the law of Cuba was sufficiently clear. 9
Analysis and experience suggest doubts as to the practicability and
acceptability of such a solution to the problem. The Crosby case was tried
in its entirety without any reference to the law of the place of injury. Only
after losing on a plea of the general issue did the defendant invoke the
principles of conflict of laws, moving for a new trial on the ground that
the plaintiff had failed to establish an essential element of his claim.00 The
trial court, adopting what we have called the "polar alternative" to dismissal,
denied the motion, holding that in the absence of proof that the foreign law
was different the law of the forum would be applied. The court of appeals
affirmed. 61 We are now to suppose that the case comes before the highest
appellate court in this posture, with the difference that there is in force a
statute authorizing the court to take judicial notice of the law of Cuba. We
are told that, instead of reversing, the court can ascertain the law of Cuba
for itself. It seems highly unlikely that a busy appellate court would do so,
and unreasonable to expect it to do so. Even on questions of domestic law,
American courts justifiably expect counsel to undertake at least the basic
responsibility for research, and to present arguments and authorities. Moreover, the ascertainment even of domestic law is a forensic affair, carried on in
the spirit of the adversary system: each side knows the contentions of the
other and each would be surprised if the court, going outside the range of
the matters argued by counsel, were to announce, without recourse, a decision
based on its private researches. These difficulties, despite the image of continental practice to the contrary, probably account for the alternative sug58.
59.
60.
61.

See N.Y. JuDIcIAL COUNCIL, NINTH ANN. REP. 271, 282-83 (1943).
Saxe, supra note 27, at 88-89.
Crosby v. Cuba R.R., 158 Fed. 144 (D.N.J. 1908).
Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 170 Fed. 369 (3d Cir. 1909).
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gestion: the appellate court may ask counsel to brief the law of Cuba. Let
us suppose that this is done and a reasonably clear picture of the Cuban law
is obtained. What then? The entire case was tried on the theory that the
law of the forum governed. If it develops that the plaintiff's evidence falls
short in some way of meeting the requirements of the Cuban law, presumably
the judgment will be reversed and a new trial granted at which the plaintiff
will have the opportunity to present additional evidence. But that is substantially the same result which was reached in the Crosby case itself, and
which was denounced by the New York Judicial Council as a "gross miscarriage of justice."'6 2 In both situations, the verdict which the plaintiff won is set
aside and he is required to undergo the delay, expense, and risk of a new trial
because of the defendant's belated invocation of conflict-of-laws rules. The
only difference is that in Crosby he would have been required to prove the
foreign law on the retrial, while under the judicial notice statute, according to
this interpretation, he would establish it less formally in the appellate court.
If the question were raised on appeal from the denial of a motion for directed
verdict, reversal would not mean a new trial as a matter of course, and the
plaintiff's cause might be irrevocably lost unless the appellate court, in the
interests of justice, should order a new trial.63 On the other hand, if the
investigation of foreign law in the appellate court discloses that the plaintiff
has proved a cause of action under that law, is the judgment in his favor thereupon to be affirmed without an opportunity to the defendant to adjust his
defense to the provisions of the foreign law, or is there to be a reopening of
the proceedings for this purpose?
Manifestly, there are involved here questions of fairness and efficiency
in procedure which cannot properly be answered by deduction from the
concept of judicial notice. Writers and draftsmen have dealt glancingly with
these questions by asking whether foreign law should be pleaded; whether
the party wishing the court to take judicial notice of foreign law should give
notice to his opponent; whether judicial notice should extend to alien systems
of law as well as to the law of sister states; whether the taking of judicial
notice should be mandatory or discretionary; and what procedural safeguards
should surround the process of judicial notice. In such approaches to the
problem the influence of deductions from the concept of judicial notice is
never wholly absent, and the precise questions to be answered are seldom,
if ever, dealt with consistently in a pragmatic and functional way. The method
is not conducive to clarity.
We have seen that, in their treatment of foreign-country law, the advo62. See N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, NINTH ANN. REP. 271, 282-83 (1943).
63. See cases cited in Walton, 233 F2d at 546 n.15. Similar relief was withheld
in the Walton case because of the plaintiff's deliberate rejection at the trial of an
opportunity to prove the Saudi Arabian law.
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cates of judicial notice have assumed that the extension of that doctrine to
foreign law imposes on the court the obligation to ascertain the foreign law
on its own motion and by its own researches. There is no other explanation
for the omission of the law of foreign countries from the Uniform Act. The
draftsmen of later statutes, extending the doctrine to foreign-country law,
have not thought otherwise; they have welcomed that obligation with respect
to sister-state law, and have only modified it with respect to foreign-country
law. The early advocates, however, were unwilling to accept the consequences
of this position even with respect to the sister-state law which they made
the subject of judicial notice. Section 4 of the Uniform Act provides:
. . . to enable a party to offer evidence of the law in another juris-

diction or to ask that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable
notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in the pleadings or
otherxvise.
This, of course, is avowedly directed only to the problem of procedural fairness; but to provide that a court may ascertain foreign law for itself is to
raise simultaneously a problem of procedural fairness and a problem of
burdening the court, and to deal with one is to deal with the other. The notice
requirement makes it reasonably clear that the court is not expected to act
on its own initiative, as well as that the opposing party is entitled to notice.
So far as the court's obligation is concerned, the point is emphasized by one
of the cases cited by the commissioners. 64 This was an action in Missouri
for injuries sustained in a grade-crossing collision in Illinois, Missouri having
a judicial notice statute similar to the Uniform Act. The plaintiff relied upon,
and pleaded, an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission requiring the
maintenance of safety gates. The case was tvice tried on the theory that
this order was controlling. On the second appeal the defendant, for the
first time, suggested that the order had been superseded by a later one.
Despite the judicial notice statute, the court refused to take the superseding
order into account because it had not been pleaded-in other words, it had
not been called to the attention of the court in timely fashion. Thus, even
where the foreign law has been invoked and some of its provisions have been
called to the attention of the court, there is no judicial obligation to perfect
the inquiry; much less is there such an obligation in the absence of notice
or assistance from counsel.
There is a strange paradox here. The framers of the Uniform Act
declined to extend it to foreign-country law because they felt that to do so
would be to impose an undue burden on the court. At the same time, they
must have recognized that the application of the doctrine even to sister-state
law would, by the same reasoning, impose an undue burden on the court.
64. Corbett v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 336 Mo. 972, 82 S.W.2d 97 (1935).
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At any rate, they recognized that fairness to the opponent required that the
party invoking the foreign law give notice; and, accordingly, they inserted
a provision which meant that there should be no such burden on the court
in the case of sister-state law; the burden must continue to rest with the
parties.05 Having made this provision, they might well have extended the
doctrine of judicial notice to foreign-country law. They did not do so.66
Later, the draftsmen of section 344-a of the New York Civil Practice Act,
moved by the annoyances of the rule requiring proof, resolved to extend
judicial notice to foreign-country law in spite of the heavy burden that would
be imposed on the court, and with little attention to the problem of procedural fairness. Did they take the step taken by the draftsmen of the Uniform
Act to shield the court from that burden? In spite of the fact that the
burden is greater where the law is that of a foreign country, in a foreign
language, they did not. On the contrary, they expressly provided that "the
failure of either party to plead any matter of law specified in this section
shall not be held to preclude either the trial or appellate court from taking
judicial notice thereof. 6 7 Instead, they relied on the discretionary character
of the statute to provide a way of escape where foreign languages and legal
systems pose too great a burden. 8
65. Notwithstanding the notice provision, commentators continued to assert that
the Uniform Act had the effect of shifting the duty of ascertaining foreign law from
counsel to the court. See Hartwig, supra note 27, at 176, 177 n.14 (1941) ; cf. Revlett
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 114 Ind. App. 187, 51 N.E.2d 95 (1943). But the notice provision
clearly relieved the judge of any duty to perceive the "materiality" of the foreign law
under the choice-of-law rule; § 2 of the act authorized the court to call upon counsel
for aid in obtaining information as to the foreign law; and it is unlikely that counsel
would request judicial notice of foreign law if he were not prepared to suggest the
tenor of that law. The commissioners were familiar with experience in Massachusetts
regarding the dual problem of fairness to the opponent and burden on the court. In
their note to § 4 they quoted with approval the Massachusetts rule of court providing
that "it shall be the duty of counsel to call to the attention of the Court such authorities
as they wish the Court to consider." 9A U.L.A. 326 (1957).
66. It is not easy to guess the nature of the assumption underlying § 4 with respect
to the consequences of failure to give notice. The statement that "the party invoking
the foreign law must give reasonable notice" seems to suggest that, if he fails to do so,
the case will be disposed of by reference to the law of the forum. So does the hypothetical illustrative case in the Commissioners' Note. Yet the pitfalls of expression in
the discussion of this problem are such that no very sure inference can be drawn on a
merely literal basis. "Invoking" is an ambiguous word. The commissioners may have
thought that a party asserting a claim founded (according to the choice-of-law rule) on
foreign law "invokes" that law, though he is content to rely on the law of the forum, as
much as does a party who can succeed only if he takes advantage of a distinctive provision
of foreign law. If we wished to pursue the inquiry into intention to an unrealistic
extreme, it might be noted that the Missouri case cited in note 64 supra was decided
on the authority of a leading case, Rositzky v. Rositzky, 329 Mo. 662, 46 S.W.2d 591
(1932), which rather strongly suggests that the failure of the plaintiff to plead (or give
timely notice of intention to- rely on) the wrongful death statute of the state of injury
means that a constitutive element of the cause of action is missing.
67. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 344-a. A spokesman for the Judicial Council explained,
not very helpfully, that the purpose of this provision was not to remove the "general"
requirement that foreign law be pleaded, but to permit justice despite harmltss error.
Saxe, supra note 27, at 89.
68. N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, NINTH ANN. Rsa'. 271, 284 (1943).
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When the California Law Revision Commission recommended the extension of judicial notice to foreign-country law, it also approached the
question of the burden on the court in terms of discretionary versus mandatory
provisions. After reviewing the judicial experience with statutes of both
types, it reached the conclusion-a surprising one, in view of the seeming
importance of the discretionary provision in the New York act-that "the
distinction which language seems to require between the Massachusetts
statute and the New York statute as to mandatory and permissive application
of judicial notice does not in fact exist to any substantial degree.""0 This
is equivalent to saying that it makes no difference whether the statute is
mandatory or discretionary in terms; either way, the courts will work out
a method of protecting themselves against an undue burden in the ascertainment of foreign law, regardless of what the legislature says. We shall have
occasion later to consider some of the cases which lead to this conclusion.
Here it is instructive to observe that nowhere in the discussion is there any
clear recognition of the fact that the question whether judicial notice should
be mandatory or discretionary is a multifarious one: If we say that the
court shall take judicial notice of foreign law, do we mean only that it must
do so without regard to the formalities of evidence law? That it must do so
whether or not one of the parties requests that it do so? That it must do so
by means of its own resources, without assistance from counsel? That it
must do so at any stage of the proceeding? That it must do so without regard
to pleading or other notice?
The California commission likewise dealt with the problem of notice
(or pleading), thereby dealing implicitly, like the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, with the problem of the judicial burden as well as explicitly with
the problem of fairness in procedure. Following the example of the Uniform
Act, it recognized the importance of notice even where sister-state law is
involved, and concluded that "when the law of a foreign country, rather than
the law of a sister state, is involved, it is even more necessary that both
court and counsel . . . give reasonable notice that such law will be relied
upon."7 0 Taking its cue from the Model Code of Evidence, it went even
71
further in providing procedural safeguards in the interest of fairness.
Strangely, however-perhaps by inadvertence abetted by the economy of the
amendatory scheme-the notice provisions and the additional safeguards
were restricted to foreign-country law and do not apply to the laws of sister
72
states.
69. CAL. LAw REVISOiN Comnm'x, op. cit. supra note 27, at 1-19. Therefore, instead
of choosing between mandatory and permissive language, it contented itself with the
neutral, declaratory formulation which was in the existing statute on judicial notice:
"Courts take judicial notice of the following . .. ." CAL. CODE CiV. PRoc. § 1875.
70. CAL. LAW REVisION COmi'N, op. cit. supra note 27, at 1-21.
71. Id. at 1-8, 1-21. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 804(1) (1942).
72. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§ 1875(3), (4), (9).
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The confusion in these judicial notice statutes is bewildering. Before
proceeding further, let me venture two observations about judicial notice
which may help to clarify the analysis:
First: The ascertainment of information relevant to the disposition of
a litigated case requires work. This is true of information as to law no less
than of factual information. It is true of domestic law and of sister-state
law as well as of the laws of foreign countries. There is no significant truth
in the statement that courts "know" their own domestic law.73 No prudent
advocate assumes that they do. There may be, from time to time, cases in
which the sole issue is factual and the controlling domestic law is undisputed.
In such cases, the work necessary to ascertain the rule of decision has simply
been done earlier, by the court and by counsel, in their studies and in the
activities in which they acquired their experience. In any case in which the
shadow of a doubt exists or can be generated, however, the court must
pro hac vice inform itself, or be informed, as to the domestic law. In a
significantly large number of cases a very real doubt exists. Search must
be made of the precedents and other authoritative sources, and the skills of
the advocate must be marshalled in the evaluation of this information and
in its presentation to the court. Not only must the court be informed; it
must be persuaded.
It goes without saying that responsibility in our system for the preliminary work of ascertaining the applicable domestic law rests upon counsel
rather than the court. For counsel to impose this task on the court, or for
the court to assume it, would be as unnatural as for the court to assume, or
have imposed upon it, the task of gathering evidence. If I may say so without
stirring a metaphysical argument, the search for domestic law in our system
is significantly like the search for facts. Have the courts in the past rendered
decisions touching this or similar questions? Has the legislature, or some
regulatory agency, acted on the matter? If so, what is the history and present
status of the enactment? The question whether an order of the Illinois
Commerce Commission has been superseded by a subsequent order of the
same agency poses the same kind of task for an Illinois lawyer or court that
it does for a Missouri lawyer or court.
Thus, ascertaining or establishing the applicable domestic law is an
integral part of the adversary process. Accordingly, some of the basic procedural principles which are required to assure that that process is due
process are required, and are in fact observed, in the ascertainment and
73. See, e.g., Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126, 132, 155 At. 47, 51 (1931); Glebe

Sugar Ref. Co. v. Trustees of the Port and Harbours, [1921] Weekly N. 85, 86. But cf.
MODEL CODE Or EviDENcE 65 (1942) : "In our system of litigation the functions assigned
to the judge make necessary the assumption that he knows and will apply the law as
embodied in the pertinent public statutes and judicial decisions."
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establishment of the applicable domestic law. By a sense of fitness which
is almost instinctive, by habit and tradition, by ethical considerations, and
by positive rules of court the practice is shaped so that each party is enabled
to know the contentions of the other as to the bearing of domestic law, and
to meet them. Although the danger of surprise is theoretically minimized by
the understanding that any relevant provision of domestic law may be
invoked, there are rules limiting the time and manner of invoking even the
prior decisions of the court in which the action is pending. 74 The principal
risk of surprise lies in the fact that no clear precept denies to our courts,
if they are so disposed, the general privilege of making independent investigations into the tenor of domestic law and deciding accordingly. Even so,
when a court, on its own initiative, decides a case entirely upon the basis
of a question of domestic law which was not argued at all by counsel-as
the Supreme Court did in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 7 5 -it exposes itself to well76
founded criticism.
What we have said of domestic law applies also to the laws of sister
states and of foreign countries. The work required to ascertain the law of a
sister state is somewhat greater, and the task of ascertaining the law of a
foreign country, in a foreign language, greater still. But in each case the
court must inform itself, or be informed; and it must be persuaded. In each
case, also, our institutions have something to say about how the burden of the
required work is to be allocated as between counsel and court, and about the
decencies of procedure.
All this seems painfully obvious. Yet much of the confusion in the
judicial notice statutes can be accounted for only on the assumption that the
obvious has been neglected. How else can we explain the fact that the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws refrained from extending judicial notice
to foreign-country law (as distinguished from sister-state law) on the apparent
77
ground that to do so would impose an undue responsibility on the court?
How else explain the New York Judicial Council's plan whereby the highest
appellate court, in a case like Crosby, would ascertain the foreign-country law
for itself and decide accordingly; or the same Council's discretionary provision
designed to allow the court to escape that responsibility when it encountered
difficulty with a foreign language?
Judicial notice is a convenient rhetorical device for rationalizing-as we
seem to have a compulsion to rationalize-the phenomenon of a court's
taking account of matters not formally introduced in evidence. It cannot
74. See, e.g., REVISED RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACtiCE 294-95 (2d ed. 1954).

75. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

41(5);

76. See Kurland, supra note 31, at 188-89 & n.10.
77. Similarly, the Model Code of Evidence did not extend judicial notice to
foreign-country law. Cf. note 73 supra.

HeinOnline -- 58 Colum. L. Rev. 990 1958

1958]

DISPLACEMENT OF THE LAW OF THE FORUM

991

perform magic, and it can easily get out of hand. Judicial notice cannot dispense with the necessity of work to find the rule of decision. It is unrealistic
and probably unwise to expect judicial notice to change the relative roles of
court and counsel by shifting the burden of that work to the court. It is
positively dangerous to entertain the notion that judicial notice can dispense
78
with procedures which safeguard the fairness of the adversary process.
Second: Judicial notice, I submit, is a device which can be understood
only if it is regarded functionally, i.e., in terms of the precise consequences
of the court's decision to employ the concept, or not to employ it, in a specific
situation. Treatments of the subject commonly give us either a collection of
isolated instances in which courts have decided whether to take account,
without proof, of various bits of information ranging from the banal to the
bizarre and the abstruse; or they generalize about the criteria, in terms of
the character of the information in question, which determine when judicial
notice is appropriate. 79 All this tells us little of how the doctrine is used
in practice. We learn, essentially, that there are some types of information
with respect to which judicial notice is never appropriate. We may well suspect, however, that within the remaining categories courts do not always
exercise the prerogative. The consequences of doing so, or of not doing so,
are too diverse. The laws of the states of the Union constitute a reasonably
homogeneous category. They have generally been declared by statute to be
information of a character susceptible of judicial notice. Yet courts do not
always take judicial notice of the laws of sister states, nor should they do so.
Suppose, first, a pretrial conference in state F. Counsel for the plaintiff
speaks: "If your Honor please, this is an action for wrongful death resulting
from an automobile collision in state X. We are, of course, aware of the rule
that the substantive law of the place of injury is controlling, and we have
prepared a memorandum setting forth the wrongful death statute of state X,
together with decisions of the courts of state X construing the statute. We ask
that the court take judicial notice of the relevant law of state X." Assuming
that the court subscribes to the theory that the foreign law is a constitutive
element of the cause of action,80 then if the court refuses to take judicial
notice of the foreign law the consequence is that the plaintiff must be prepared
to establish it by formal proof. 81 This will needlessly increase the trouble
78. See Arams v. Arams, 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Busch,
supra note 27; Sommerich & Busch, supra note 27; Stern, supra note 27.
79. See, e.g., UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 9.
There has been no systematic
functional analysis of judicial notice, though such an approach has been approximated
in McCormick, supra note 20, at 298, and Comment, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 509 (1943).
80. This assumption will be continued throughout the discussion immediately following. We shall also assume that the consequence of the plaintiff's failure to get the
foreign law before the court in some manner will not be mitigated by any presumption
as to the tenor of the foreign law.
81. For present purposes we may leave aside other possible consequences, such as the
submission of the issue to the jury or the unappealability of the determination.
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and expense to which the plaintiff must go to establish the foreign law, but
it is by no means fatal to his claim. If, instead, the court decides that it will
judicially notice the law of state X, the plaintiff is saved that additional
trouble and expense. He is not, however, relieved of the necessity of persuading the court that his contentions as to the tenor of the foreign law
are sound.
Suppose, secondly, that the same action goes to trial and is conducted
by the plaintiff as if it were a purely domestic case. The plaintiff makes no
reference to the law of state X. He apparently assumes that the law of state F
governs, and he succeeds in making a prima facie case under that law. At the
close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant asserts for the first time the relevance of foreign law and moves for a directed verdict or for dismissal on the
ground that an essential element of the cause of action has not been made to
appear. If the court refuses to take judicial notice, the consequences to the
plaintiff will depend upon other rules of trial practice. Thus, if the plaintiff
is not permitted to reopen his case and introduce evidence of the foreign law,
the refusal is fatal to his cause of action.8 2 If he is permitted to reopen his
case for this purpose, the refusal will not be fatal-provided he is also permitted to introduce additional factual evidence, if necessary, to show fulfillment
of the requirements of the foreign statute. If the court does take judicial
notice, the consequence will depend both upon the tenor of the foreign law
and upon other rules of practice. Thus, if the foreign statute is identical with
that of the forum, the plaintiff's case will be saved. If the foreign statute is
different and requires a showing of facts not shown in the plaintiff's evidence,
noticing the foreign statute will be fatal, unless the plaintiff is permitted to
reopen in order to introduce additional evidence.
Suppose, finally, that the entire case is tried as if it were a domestic one,
neither party referring at the trial to the foreign law. At appropriate times
the defendant moves for a directed verdict on the general ground that the
evidence is insufficient to establish a right to recover, but the motions are
denied and the plaintiff obtains verdict and judgment. On appeal, defendant
asserts for the first time the relevance of foreign law and contends that there
should be a reversal since that law was not made to appear. Assuming that
the court will entertain such a suggestion at this stage,8 3 its refusal to take
judicial notice of the foreign law will be quite serious in its consequences for
82. Whether his claim is irrevocably lost depends upon whether the judgment is

regarded as one on the merits and whether a new action can be commenced before the
period of limitations expires. See note 150 infra.

83. Such a practice is contemplated by the proposed UNIFoRM RULE OF EVIDENCE 12.

See note 90 infra. On one occasion the Massachusetts court construed its judicial notice
statute as permitting this practice, reaching a highly dubious result, Walker v. Lloyd, 295
Mass. 507, 4 N.E.2d 306 (1936) ; but both before and after this decision, the court condemned the practice. In Lennon v. Cohen, 264 Mass. 414, 421-22, 163 N.E. 63, 67 (1928).
the court said, by way of dictum: "An important question of foreign law, even under said
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the plaintiff. Conceivably, the judgment below might be reversed with directions to grant the motion for directed verdict, in which case the plaintiff
would be out of court. At best there would be a reversal with directions to
grant a new trial,8 4 the plaintiff being permitted to introduce evidence of the
foreign law and such additional factual evidence as might be necessary to
meet the requirements of the foreign statute. If the court does take judicial
notice and the foreign law is identical with that of the forum, the defendant
might as well have spared himself the trouble of making the point; the judgment will be affirmed. But if the foreign law is different and the evidence
in the record fails to make a case under the foreign law, the consequence will
be reversal-meaning that the plaintiff is either out of court or must undertake a new trial.8 5
In the first case, taking judicial notice has the salutary (but relatively
minor) effect of saving needless trouble and expense. In the third case, taking
judicial notice may very well have the effect of forcing the successful plaintiff
c. 168, cannot be raised as of right at the argument in this court for the first time: and this
court cannot thus be required to make a decision about it by taking judicial notice of it....
In any event, there can be no review by this court unless a ruling of law is made by the
trial court, to which exception is taken, or unless by some other recognized method enough
is put upon the record so that the foreign law rightly can be considered by this court" And
in Donahue v. Dal, Inc., 314 Mass. 460, 463, 50 N.E. 2d 207, 209 (1943), the court said:
"The case was tried without any reference whatever to the law of New York as far as the

record discloses.... But now for the first time, for all that appears, the defendant contends

that the contract, having been made in New York, is governed by its law and it cites cases
as to that la.,... In the circumstances we do not consider them. The defendant is seeking
here to raise an issue for the first time. It is too late. It would be a manifest injustice to

allow it to do so." See Note, 32 Mass. L.Q. May 1947, p. 20: "[The judicial notice statute]
was not intended to relieve counsel of their obligation to assist the courts-still less, was it
intended to provide a trap." Comment, 42 MicH. L. REv. 509 (1943), though recognizing

that "the weight of judicial authority would seem committed to the view that the statutory

or common-law rule must be properly brought to the attention of the trial court if counsel

desires notice by the appellate court," id. at 517-18, nevertheless argues that "there would

seem to be little reason for an appellate court's refusal to use all available legal materials

in repairing and correcting the judgment of the trial court."
84. See note 63 m.pra.
85. This has been a sampling, not an exhaustive enumeration, of the situations in
which the demand for judicial notice of foreign law may arise. Suppose that the case is
tried on the tacit assumption that domestic law governs, and the plaintiff fails to establish
a claim under that law. Should he be saved by a belated invocation of foreign law, and, if

so, under what procedural conditions?
Imagination is no match for the cases themselves in providing variations. In Petersen
v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 138 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1943), the action, in Nebraska, was tried
throughout on the assumption that the law of Iowa, the place of injury, was controlling,
although that law was neither pleaded nor proved. Iowa law required a showing of negligence; Nebraska law did not. At the last minute, when the case was ready for argument,
the plaintiff asked the court to charge that, since the foreign law had not been pleaded and
proved, it must be presumed to be the same as the law of the forum. The request was
refused. On appeal from an adverse verdict and judgment, the plaintiff contended that the
refusal was a violation of the rule that a court may not take judicial notice of foreign law.
The judgment was affirmed, the court of appeals holding that the plaintiff was estopped to
complain of the determination of the case in accordance with the foreign law. See also
Annot., 149 A.L.R. 759 (1944). Of course, a judicial notice statute is not necessary in
order to deal properly with such situations, as the Petersen case demonstrates. Indeed,
the problem may still arise under judicial notice statutes which require that a finding as to
the foreign law be made a part of the record. Cf. UNIFORm RULE OF EvIDENCE 11.
The presence of a foreign factor may not be discovered until after the issues have been
framed. See Hammond Motor Co. v. Warren, 113 Kan. 44, 45, 213 Pac. 810, 811 (1923).
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to a new trial for no better reason than that the defendant belatedly made a
point which he should have been required to make in the beginning. The
justification for judicial notice is not the same in the two cases, in spite of
the fact that the character of the information noticed is identical. Yet an
unqualified provision for judicial notice of foreign law calls for the invocation
of that doctrine irrespective of the procedural consequences.
A provision that a party who wishes the court to take judicial notice of
foreign law shall give reasonable notice to his adversary serves, as we have
seen, the purpose of avoiding surprise and other procedural injustices and
also places responsibility for invoking foreign law upon the parties as distinguished from the court. Yet section 4 of the Uniform Act, providing for
such notice, has been criticized as an "Achilles' heel," derogating from the
mandatory character of the act.8 6 It is said that such a requirement "preserves
a link with the past," i.e., with the old requirement that foreign law be
pleaded. 8 7 So it does. But the requirement of pleading is not to be dismissed
merely because it was a part of the old scheme of things, or because, as a
matter of formal logic, matters judicially noticed need not be pleaded. The
question to be asked is what purposes were served by the requirement.
To the extent that the requirement was not observed and the omission
was not curable by amendment, its effect was determined by the court's basic
philosophy of conflict of laws. In courts committed to the vested-rights theory
of the Crosby case, the pleading which set forth a cause of action or a defense
governed by foreign law would fail if the foreign law was not alleged and if
no presumption as to the foreign law was available. On the other hand, in
courts adhering to the older (or English) view, the consequence of failure to
invoke foreign law in the approved manner was simply that the claim or
defense would be tested by the law of the forum.
To the extent that the requirement was observed, it operated to: (1)
place upon the parties responsibility for invoking foreign law; (2) give the
adversary timely notice of the contention that foreign law governs, enabling
him to meet that contention; (3) give the adversary timely notice of the
contention as to the tenor of the foreign law, enabling him to meet that contention; and (4) give the adversary adequate opportunity to prepare his case
to meet the requirements of foreign law if it should be held controlling. In
short, the pleading requirement meant that, subject to the curative possibilities
of amendment, foreign law must be invoked, if at all, at such a time and in
such a way that it could be taken into account in the formulation of the issues
for trial."' On the whole, the requirement seems to have served a useful
purpose. The issues for trial cannot be formulated without reference to the
86. HARPER, TAINTOR,
(1950).
87. Id. at 116.

CARNAHAN

& BROWN,

CASES oN CoNFicT oF LAWS
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rule of decision. Perhaps the requirement was unnecessarily formal; certainly,
the informality of the pretrial conference could be substituted for the formality
of pleading. But enthusiasts for judicial notice, and especially those who
regret the persistence of the requirement of pleading or its equivalent, should
specify just which functions or aspects of such a requirement they wish to
89
abrogate.
With these observations in mind, let us consider the provisions for
judicial notice of foreign law found in the proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence. 0 These were formulated so recently that the draftsmen had the benefit
of nearly all the experience accumulated under similar statutory provisions.
91
They are based upon the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence
92
They
and carry the stamp of approval of the American Bar Association.
may therefore be regarded as probably the most sophisticated and best informed
provisions for judicial notice yet drafted.
The first provision, found in rule 9(1), is that "judicial notice shall be
taken without request by a party, of the common law, constitutions and public
statutes in force in every state

. . .

of the United States .

. . ."

(Emphasis

added.) Paragraph (2) of rule 9 provides that "judicial notice may be taken
without request by a party, of... the laws of foreign countries .... " (Emphasis added.) Paragraph (3) provides:
Judicial notice shall be taken of . . . [the laws of foreign countries]

if a party requests it and (a) furnishes the judge sufficient information to enable him properly to comply with the request and (b) has
given each adverse party such notice as the judge may require to
enable the adverse party to prepare to meet the request. (Emphasis
added.)
Later sections must be consulted before we can judge the precise effect
of rule 9. At this point we may note, however, that sister-state law and
88. One aspect of the requirement of pleading and proof was the possibility that the
evidence might fail to sustain the allegations as to foreign law. That situation should be
avoided in a modern, less formal system, especially since a court should ordinarily not
hold that foreign law is controlling until it has determined the tenor of that law. Even
so, a comparable situation could arise where a party elects to stake his claim or defense
on the foreign law, and the applicability of that law is not contested. If, having done
this, the party fails to satisfy the court as to the provisions of the foreign law, I do not
suggest that he should be saved by application of the law of the forum, though he may
have made out a claim or defense thereunder.
89. The authors of the "Achilles' heel" stricture in the end moderated their criticism:
"It does not seem unreasonable to require a party to a suit with foreign elements to
indicate to his adversary approximately where in the territorial-legal chain he will
strike, so long as this desire to avoid surprise does not develop into a conspicuous
loophole in a statute which is essentially simple, has been widely enacted as the result of a
long-felt need, and promises to be effective." HARER, TAINTOR, CARNAHAN" & BROWN,
op. cit. supra note 86, at 117. It seems to me nevertheless that the emphasis is inverted.

90.

UNIFORM RULEs OF EViDENc E

91.

UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENcE
REP. 134 (1953).

9-12.

at 3.

92. 78 A.B.A.
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foreign-country law are treated differently, and we may wonder why, since
our discussion has not disclosed a valid reason for differential treatment.0 3
The difference is by no means as radical as that in the Uniform Judicial Notice
of Foreign Law Act, which did not provide at all for judicial notice of foreigncountry law.94 It is only that judicial notice of sister-state law is mandatory,
while notice of foreign-country law is discretionary in the absence of request
by a party; and notice of foreign-country law becomes mandatory when a
party makes the request, furnishes adequate information, and gives the adversary notice.
If rule 9(1) means what it says, it places an extraordinary responsibility
upon the court-and sets extraordinary traps for the litigants. The court is
to act upon its own initiative. Without request by a party, the court is to
be alert to the significance of foreign factors, quick in its characterization
of the problem, and ready with the appropriate rule for choice of law. Thereafter, it is to ascertain the applicable law of the sister state, presumably
through its own research. The rule contains no limitation as to the stage
of the proceeding at which such action by the court is required.
Do subsequent rules modify this responsibility and its apparent departure
from the ordinary procedures of the adversary system? Rule 10(1) provides
that "the judge shall afford each party reasonable opportunity to present
to him information relevant to the propriety of taking judicial notice of a
matter or to the tenor of the matter to be noticed." This is some help. At
least the parties are not to be confronted with a fait accompli in the determination of the tenor of the foreign law; they will be given a chance to
litigate that question. Thus the elementary necessity for notice is to some
extent observed. Adequate notice in this context requires, however, not
merely an opportunity to argue about the tenor of the foreign law, but also
an opportunity to present a case which meets the requirements of the foreign
law, if that is to furnish the rule of decision. Rule 10(1) apparently affords
no help on this score. The opportunity to present information relevant to
the propriety of taking judicial notice apparently relates to the propriety of
classifying the matter to be noticed within the categories enumerated in
rule 9; but there can be little doubt that the law of a sister state is the law
93. See note 77 supra. It is interesting that rule 9 groups sister-state law with
"such specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge as are so universally
known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute," while grouping foreigncountry law with "specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge which are
capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources
of indisputable accuracy."
94. Neither did MODEL CODE OF EvIDENcE rules 801-06 (1942), although the commissioners state that the "principal difference!' between the Uniform Rules and the
Model Code is that by the Uniform Rules judicial notice of the public law of sister
RULE OF EvENczE 9, comment.
states is made "mandatory." UNwOPm
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of a sister state. The parties could, of course, argue about the appropriateness of the choice-of-law rule invoked by the court; but if that is clear, the
"propriety" of taking judicial notice of sister-state law would appear to be
a foregone conclusion. So far, nothing prevents the judge from announcing
at any stage of the proceeding his intention to take notice of the law of a
sister state as the rule of decision.
Rule 10(1) may also tend to mitigate the burden apparently cast upon
the court by rule 9(1). If the judge announces to the parties his intention
to notice the law of a sister state and invites them to submit information
as to its tenor, it may be assumed that they will ordinarily do so. He is not
confined to the information provided by their assistance, however; rule 10(2)
states that he "may consult and use any source of pertinent information,
whether or not furnished by a party." 95 Indeed, rule 10(3) provides: "If
the information possessed by or readily available to the judge, whether or
not furnished by the parties, fails to convince him that a matter falls clearly
within Rule 9, or if it is insufficient to enable him to notice the matter
judicially, he shall decline to take judicial notice thereof." If this means
what it says, the "mandatory" provision of rule 9(1) would appear to be
rendered nugatory. The principal difference in treatment between sisterstate law and foreign-country law in the Uniform Rules is that judicial notice
of foreign-country law is discretionary unless the interested party gives the
judge sufficient information to enable him to determine what the foreign
law is. If rule 10(3) applies to sister-state law, this difference disappears;
judicial notice is "discretionary" in either case. The destruction of the
distinction so carefully made in rule 9 may constitute an argument against
construing rule 10 as applying to the matters covered in rule 9(1) ; perhaps
it should be construed as applying only to those covered in rule 9(2). It
95. Though this provision is basically sound, it involves a substantial problem of
fairness. A virtue of the old system of proving foreign law was that each party knew

the sources which were relied upon to establish its tenor, so that the adversary process
could function fully in its determination. Rule 10(1) of the Uniform Rules omits the
provision of rule 804(1) of the Model Code which requires the judge to "inform the
parties of the tenor of any matter to be judicially noticed by him." This provision may
have been thought redundant; but it was clearly not so if it meant that the judge should
also indicate to the parties his sources of information. The California statute, CAL.
Con CIV. Paoc. §1875(9), is specific in providing a partial safeguard: "[In taking
judicial notice of foreign-country law] the court may also resort to the advice of persons
learned in the subject matter, which advice, if not received in open court, shall be in
writing and made a part of the record in the action or proceeding." Draftsmen of
judicial notice statutes would do well to heed the admonition of Judge Wyzanski:
"[a] judge, before deriving any conclusions from any such extra-judicial document or

information, should lay it before the parties for their criticism .... [B]efore a judge
acts upon a consideration of any kind, he ought to give the parties a chance to meet it.
This opportunity is owed as a matter of fairness and also to prevent egregious error."
A TrAL JUDGE's FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 18-19 (1952). See also Arams v.

Arams, 182 Misc. 328, 330-31, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Sommerich &

Busch, mipra note 27, at 156-59.
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is not by its terms so limited, however. Reading it as it stands would lead
to the result that there is no substantial difference, for purposes of judicial
notice, between sister-state law and foreign-country law; and, since there
still appears to be no valid reason for a difference, this is perhaps as it
should be.
Thus, the proposed rules do not impose an unreasonable burden on the
court. It need never act unless the parties are willing to give assistance.
And the parties are protected against surprise in the sense that the rules
provide for adequate opportunity to be heard on the question of the applicability and tenor of the foreign law. There remains the very serious difficulty
that so far there has appeared no provision limiting the time at which the
foreign law may be invoked, whether by the court on its own initiative or
on the request of a party, so that there remains the danger of surprise in
the sense that a party may be confronted in most untimely fashion by a
change in the fundamental assumptions underlying the presentation of his case.
Subsequent provisions of the rules do not obviate this difficulty. On the
contrary, they confirm and aggravate it. Rule 12(1) provides that "the failure
or refusal of the judge to take judicial notice of a matter. . . shall not preclude
the judge from taking judicial notice of the matter in subsequent proceedings
in the action." Presumably this includes the case in which the judge has
refused to take judicial notice under rule 10(3), where the interested party
has failed to furnish adequate information as to the foreign law; but it is bad
enough without that feature. This clearly means that the court may take
judicial notice of the foreign law on a motion for new trial, although no
mention has been made of the conflict-of-laws problem at the trial itself. In
some situations, at least-as, for example, in the hypothetical action for
wrongful death discussed above, and in the Crosby case 9 0-- this is so palpably
unjust as to require no comment. But even worse is in store. According to
rule 12(3), "the reviewing court in its discretion may take judicial notice of
any matter specified in Rule 9 whether or not judicially noticed by the judge."
This means that the foreign law may be invoked for the first time on appeal,
even by the court on its own motion, notwithstanding the fact that the conflictof-laws aspects of the case have been totally ignored by both parties on the
trial. In short, the foreign law may be invoked at any stage of the proceeding.
Nowhere do the rules and their accompanying comments state what the
procedural consequence is to be when the foreign law referred to by the
choice-of-law rule is not made to appear by judicial notice or otherwise. It is
difficult to imagine, however, why one would provide for mandatory judicial
notice without request by a party if he were not assuming, as did Mr. justice
96. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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Holmes, that the rule of decision can be furnished only by the foreign law.
Under the polar alternative, the law of the forum is applicable unless and
until a party wishing the advantage of some distinctive provision of the
foreign law invokes that law in some appropriate fashion. If that is the underlying philosophy, there is no need whatever to charge the court with responsibility to notice foreign law on its own motion.
The rules, then, apparently proceed on the basis of the same vested-rights
theory which dictated the result in the Crosby and Walton cases. Against that
background, the provisions which permit a party, or even the court on its
own motion, to suggest the "materiality" of the foreign law at any stage of the
litigation are most unfortunate and will certainly lead to injustice unless the
courts find ways to avoid them (as the courts are quite likely to do).07 There
may be some situations in which the ends of justice will be served by permitting the court at a late stage of the proceedings to supply an inadvertent
omission by noticing foreign law. For example, when the plaintiff has deliberately staked his claim on the foreign law, but has failed to furnish the court
with information regarding some detail of that law necessary to complete the
logical chain, there seems no harm in allowing the court to fill the gap, even
on appeal.98 There are ways of dealing with such problems without investing
foreign law with the quality of information which is presumed to be so well
known or accessible that it may fairly be invoked at any time. The far more
significant body of cases consists of those in which the case is tried on the
assumption that local law governs. In those cases, to allow the materiality of
the foreign law to be suggested, or its content to be noticed, at a late stage of
the proceedings will work injustice more often than not.
Finally, let it be noted that the doctrine of judicial notice would provide
no real relief from the injustice of the result in cases like Walton. True, if
the proposed Uniform Rules had been in effect, the court of appeals would have
been authorized, in its discretion, without request by a party, to ascertain
the law of Saudi Arabia for itself, consulting "any source of pertinent information." It is inconceivable that it would have done this. True, if the rules had
been in effect the plaintiff would have been permitted to present informally
to the court sufficient information to enable it to ascertain the tenor of that
97. See notes 78, 83 supra.
98. See Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 265 App. Div. 278, 38 N.Y.S.2d 788
(1st Dep't 1942), which may present such a situation, though I would prefer to deal with
that case in terms of the analysis suggested in notes 138-70 infra and accompanying text.

Matter of Peart, 277 App. Div. 61, 97 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1st Dep't 1950), is not in
point here. The case is one in which, in the absence of a showing of the foreign
(Maryland) law, the court simply applied the law of the forum. What is even more
important, the case was not one in which the foreign law was referred to as the
source of the rule of decision. Cf. Matter of Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div. 181, 254

N.Y. Supp. 439 (3d Dep't 1931) ; Sommerich & Busch, supra note 27. at 159: note 166
infra and accompanying text
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law. It seems unlikely that this opportunity would have been of much practical value. As we have observed, the plaintiff was not taken by surprise by
the suggestion that Saudi Arabian law governed. The case had been pending
for some six years before it was brought to trial. 99 The record is replete with
intimations that an attempt to ascertain the Saudi Arabian law would be
frustrating, to say the least.10 0 In the course of preparing this article I have
made some effort to determine what the Saudi Arabian law might have to say
on the subject. These efforts have had little success. One learns that the law
of Saudi Arabia is the pure Islamic law of the Hanbali school, almost untouched by Western influences, but supplemented to some extent by royal
decrees. Islamic law is integrally related to the Islamic religion. 10 1 While
there is a modern code of traffic regulations, 10 2 one is left with the distinct
impression that counsel for the plaintiff probably concluded that any adequate
investigation of the relevant Saudi Arabian law would be very expensive in
relation to the probable verdict, and that in the end such an investigation
would be unlikely to disclose any settled provisions clearly applicable to
injuries inflicted upon foreigners by motor vehicles operated by corporate
employees. The burden placed upon the plaintiff was one that he could hardly
be expected to bear, even with the aid of judicial notice. One cannot comfortably accede to Judge Frank's intimation that the burden of establishing
foreign law should be placed on the party who happens to be in the best
position to obtain the information ;103 that would seem to be a criterion too
elusive and variable from case to case. It does seem unfair, however, to require
99. Brief for Appellant, app. p. 17.
100. The court intimated that the measure of damages might be different under
Saudi Arabian law. Id. at 13. The defendant rather strongly intimated that Saudi

Arabia might not recognize the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 17, 24-25.
101. See Anderson, Law as a Social Force in Islamic Culture and History, in
BULLETIN OF THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES 13, 15 (1957). See also
FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW (2d ed. 1955); SCHACHT, ORIGINS OF
MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE (1950) ; Hebachy, Islam: Factorsof Stability and Change,
54 COLUm. L. REv. 710 (1954) ; Hart, Application of Hanbalite and Decree Law to
Foreignersin Saudi Arabia, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 165 (1953).
Of special interest is the possibility that if the Walton case had been brought
before a Muslim qadi, he might have refused to assume jurisdiction over two nonbelievers, or would have attempted to apply the national law of the litigants. 1 KHADDURI & LIEBESNY, LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST

338 (1955).

In an address entitled "Doctrines Peculiar to Islamic Law," delivered March 18,
1958 at a meeting of the American Foreign Law Association, Professor Joseph H.
Schacht indicated that (1) the measure of damages under Saudi Arabian law would
be highly restrictive, as compared with the common-law measure; and (2) that, without
recourse to anything resembling the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior,
Saudi Arabian law would fix responsibility upon the corporate employer for injuries
accidentally inflicted by the employee, by analogy to an established practice of fixing
such responsibility upon the members of the culprit's tribe.
102. Saudi Arabia Director of Public Security, Revised Automobile Regulations,
approved by Royal Decree No. 13125 (November 19, 1942), in Brief for Respondent
in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari p. 10, Walton v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
103. 233 F.2d at 545.
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the plaintiff in effect to establish the general theory of Saudi Arabian law
with respect to personal injuries negligently inflicted by servants, when the
defendant might with relative ease have established any specific feature of
that law which 'might have precluded recovery-such as nonrecognition of the
doctrine of respondeat superior.
Judicial notice, then, turns out to be something less than an ideal
solution of our problem. The conviction grows that we would have been
better off if that concept had not been employed at all. The inquiry into the
tenor of foreign law could have been freed from the exclusionary rules of
evidence, the responsibility for the determination could have been transferred
from the jury to the judge, and the determination could have been made
reviewable on appeal, all without any resort to the concept of judicial notice.
So could any other purpose we might wish to accomplish. The employment
of the concept has led to undesirable collateral consequences and has tended
to create a deceptive illusion of freedom from the inescapable fact that a
great deal of effort may be required in order to ascertain the foreign law.
A satisfactory way out of the difficulty can be found only if we address ourselves directly to the underlying question of conflict of laws, the answer to
which tends to be taken for granted by those who draft judicial notice statutes.
VI.

ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITIONS:

THE LAW OF THE FORUmt

There was a time when a court's application of foreign law was a

phenomenon so remarkable that its explanation constituted the central problem
of conflict-of-laws theory. The theoretical explanation which became dominant
in the twentieth century-the vested-rights theory of Beale, Holmes, and
the Restatement'K--has exerted a powerful influence. Nowhere is the power
of that influence more graphically illustrated than in Holmes' decision in
the Crosby case.10 5 This theory underlies most of the modern efforts to
find a just solution to the procedural difficulties relating to foreign lawefforts to devise saving presumptions, or to interpose the doctrine of judicial
notice, where otherwise the theory would dictate the collapse of a claim or
defense as the consequence of a party's failure to establish the foreign law
on which it depends. According to this theory, a choice-of-law rule, as we
have said before, is a categorical imperative; it commands the court to
apply the law of a designated foreign state, and no other. If the foreign law
is not made to appear, by proof or by judicial notice, and if some not-veryreasonable facsimile cannot be substituted by way of presumption, the claim
104. See Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARv. L. REv. 822 (1950);
Cheatham, America) Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV.
L. REv. 361 (1945).
105. See text at note 3 supra.
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or defense must fail. The foreign law becomes "material" as soon as it is
disclosed that there is a foreign factor in the case-a factor which is mentioned
in some appropriate choice-of-law rule referring to the law of a foreign state
as controlling.
Very different was the attitude toward foreign law and choice-of-law
rules which prevailed earlier in this country. More than a century ago, the
New York Court of Appeals expressed it as follows:
• . . the laws of the country to whose courts a party appeals for
redress, furnish, in all cases, prima facie, the rule of decision; and
if either party wishes the benefit of a different rule or law . . . he
must aver and prove it.Y° 6
This was the "polar alternative" available to the court in the Walton case.
This was the basis on which the lower federal courts had disposed of the
problem in Crosby.10 7 This is also the rule in England even today.'0 8 As
we have noted, it has the virtue of adaptation to the habits and inclinations
of judges and lawyers, and is far less likely to lead to surpise, hardship, and
injustice than the contrary rule. In those cases in which a party has in truth
acted in reliance upon some provision of foreign law-and these are the
cases in which the strongest argument for application of foreign law can be
made-it is surely no hardship to require him to invoke it and inform
the court of its tenor. 0 9 It is obvious that this rule would liberate us from
the sophistries" ° of the various presumptions as to the content of the foreign
law. We are now in position to state, in addition, that it would free us from
all the perplexities which beset the effort to deal with the problem of foreign
law, under the opposite rule, by means of judicial notice. If this rule were
accepted, we could still free the inquiry into foreign law from the formal
requirement of pleading and the formalities and exclusionary rules of the
law of evidence, and we could still transfer responsibility for the determination
106. Monroe v. Douglas, 5 N.Y. 447, 452 (1851). Although it sets forth the
classic formulation of the rule, the case is not a square authority because Scottish law
was in fact considered by the court.

107. Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 170 Fed. 369, 370 (3d Cir. 1909). The court added:

"As we regard [the authorities] . . . they are all one way, without a variant note,
the contrary rule, which we are asked to lay down, whatever be said of its logic, having
nothing by way of authority on which to stand." Id. at 379.
108. See note 17 supra.
109. It may be added that a court is in a better position to do justice with insight
when it is applying its own law. "Every time judges are called upon to apply the law of
a foreign jurisdiction are they not inclined to give undue weight to the recorded
landmarks and to underestimate the mobile qualities and thrusts of principle we discern
in our domestic law?" WYZANsiI, A TgrIAL JuDGE's F=mDoM AND RES Po NsITY 23
(1952). This is an argument to be used with caution, however. It has validity only
where there is reason to regard the "mobile qualities and thrusts of principle" of
domestic law as appropriate to the case in hand. A thesis of this article is that the
number of cases in which the law of the forum is appropriate is far greater than present
conflict-of-laws doctrine allows. Nevertheless, not all cases are in this category.
110. See Kales, supra note 18; Nussbaum, supra note 44, at 1035.
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from the jury to the court, and make it reviewable. It would be dear, however, that the party wishing to rely on the foreign law must invoke it, and
the consequence of his failure to do so would be the application of domestic
law. It would be clear that he would be required to invoke it in such manner
and at such time as to give the opposing party not only an opportunity to be
heard as to its applicability and tenor, but an opportunity to prepare his case
to meet the requirements of the foreign law if it is applicable. The invocation
would have to be timely; the ground rules for the litigation would be settled
at the outset. There would be no question of the foreign law hanging nimbuslike over the litigation, all-powerful in spite of ignorant neglect, ready to
take over the moment anyone happens to notice it. It would be clear that
there is no question of transferring from counsel to court the responsibility
for ascertaining foreign law: the job of persuasion must be done by the party
invoking that law. Moreover, it would be clear that for the purposes under
discussion there is no difference between the law of a sister state and that of
a foreign country, no matter how exotic.
Of special importance is the fact that this rule would enable any court,
before holding foreign law controlling, to know the content or tenor of that
law. The most shocking aspect of the Walton decision is the holding that
Saudi Arabian law displaced the law of the forum although the court presumably had no idea what the relevant provisions of that law-if any-were.",
The application of foreign law is justified when that law expresses a policy of
the foreign state, when the connections of the case with the foreign state are
such as to give it a legitimate interest in having its policy applied, and when
there is no conflicting interest of the forum state. 1 12 A court is not justified
in holding that foreign law displaces local law as the rule of decision when it
cannot make the determination that the interest of the foreign state is entitled
to recognition, and it can seldom make that determination when it has no
information concerning the foreign law and policy.
It is apparent, but it must be emphasized, that the rule under discussion
is based upon an entirely different theory of conflict of laws from that which
underlies the rule of Crosby and Walton. Those cases proceed on the basis of
the obligatio theory, or the theory of vested rights: the foreign state is the
only state having "jurisdiction" to create the right. The alternative view is
that the law of the forum controls, though the relief afforded by that law will
be shaped, at the instance of an affected party, to take account of the circumstance that foreign factors are involved. According to the vested-rights theory,
111. See notes 8, 28 supra.
112. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173
(1933) ; Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25
U. CI. L. REv. 227 (1958) ; Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958).
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the choice-of-law rule is an inexorable command to apply the foreign law or
none. According to the alternative view, the law of the forum is prima facie
applicable, but the choice-of-law rule permits a party, if it is to his advantage,
to invoke the foreign law.113 What happens then is explained not by the vestedrights theory but by the local-law theory:
[T] he forum, when confronted by a case involving foreign elements,
always applies its own law to the case, but in doing so adopts and
enforces as its own law a rule of decision identical, or at least highly
similar though not identical, in scope with a rule of decision found
in the system of law in force in another state or country with which
some or all of the foreign elements are connected. .

.

. The forum
14

thus enforces not a foreign right but a right created by its own law.

Nussbaum recognized that the rule that the law of the forum governs until
foreign law is appropriately invoked was an argument against the vested-rights
theory." 15 However, although he favored the adoption of that rule, he could
not bring himself to break completely with the imperative concept of choice-oflaw rules. 1 6 For that reason, perhaps, he refrained from taking a position
which seems tenable: that no one who is persuaded by Cook's local-law theory
can consistently prefer the rule of the Crosby and Walton cases to its polar
alternative. Theories of conflict of laws do affect both the course of judicial
decision and the thinking of commentators."1 Nowhere is this more apparent
113. See Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 267, 84 A.2d 725, 728 (1951).

In this

thorough and perceptive opinion, Judge Vanderbilt stopped just short of adopting in its
entirety the rule under discussion, preferring to bolster the application of the law of
the forum by the dubious "acquiescence" theory, as well as by some attention to the
procedural situation. The defects of the acquiescence theory are perhaps best exhibited
by one of its most careful statements. See The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 31-32 (1881).
114. Coox, op. cit. supra note 2, at 20-21; see Cavers, The Two "Local Law"
Theories, 63 HARV. L. REv. 822 (1950) ; cf. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the
Conflict of Laws, 37 YALuE L.J. 468, 478 (1928): "And, in the last analysis, it is a simple

question of convenience and equity, roughly controlled by the traditions of the forum,

as to how far the court will, can, or should relax its domestic habits of decision to give
a judgment more or less resembling that which might be secured in the court of another
jurisdiction. The basis of departure is the practice of the forum and the equities of the
instant case, and not universal principle or vested right. In the field of conflict of laws
ts in other branches of the law, the problem is essentially one of adjustment of actual
interests and not of formal logic."
115. Nussbaum, supra note 44, at 1042 n.141.
116. Id. at 1042.
117. Cf. Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 H.Av. L. Rzv. 822 (1950).

Holmes was explicit as to the influence of theory: ".

.

. the disregard of the foreign law

occasionally indicated by some English judges before the theory to be applied was quite

worked out must be disregarded in its turn." Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478

(1912). (Emphasis added.) Beale declared that "it would seem to do complete violence
to the rules of Conflict of Laws of the forum to say, as the New York court said in
Savage v. O'Neil [44 N.Y. 298 (1871)]: '. . . and in the absence of proof our own
law must of necessity furnish the rule for the guidance of our courts.'" 3 BEALE,
Professor Beale's argument is reminiscent of the
CONFLICT OF LAws § 622A.2 (1935).
contention that acceptance of the renvoi is "subversive," that it "flouts the law," and that
it "involves a conscious neglect of the rules that are binding upon the Court." CHESHmE,
PrvATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 57, 59 (2d ed. 1938). For a definitive answer to this
contention see Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Hanv. L. REv. 1165 (1938).
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than in the cases and commentaries dealing with what happens when the
foreign law is not made to appear.
The powerful influence-even the hypnotic effect-which the vested-rights
theory has had on legal thinking devoted to that question is easily traced.
It is evident in attitudes toward the various presumptions as to the tenor of
foreign law. A mind liberated from that influence can view the presumptions
with detachment, recognizing that however artificial may be the reproductions
they yield of the foreign law, their general tendency is to bring about the
application of the law of the forum, 1" 8 which is as it should be in the absence
of any appropriate showing of the foreign law. If a California court is under
an absolute duty, by virtue of a choice-of-law rule, to apply the law of Mexico
or no law at all, it is ridiculous for it to apply the common and statute law of
California with the explanation that it "presumes" the law of Mexico to be
identical in all respects, and is therefore applying the law of Mexico." 9 But
a mind free to doubt the imperative character of the choice-of-law rule may
see in this strange behavior confirmation of the fact that courts are to a substantial degree unwilling to accept the consequences of the vested-rights theory
and are in fact, though not in terms, following the alternative theory that the
law of the forum is prima facie controlling. Such insight, however, has not
been given to all, or even most, observers. Even Nussbaum, who recognized
this significance of the presumptions, did not see that the point was a powerful
argument in favor of his position, but felt constrained to speak of the strongest
presumption with contempt:
One presumption used, mechanical in its application and sweeping
in its scope, is that, in the absence of proof of the foreign law, the
court must assume that the foreign law is the same as the law of the
forum. The alleged presumption is an obvious non sequitur and
nothing but a crude fiction disguising the substitution of the law
of the forum for the unproved or unascertainable foreign law. 20
Holmes himself said:
Whatever presumption there is is purely one of fact, that may be
corrected by proof. Therefore the presumption should be limited to
cases in which it reasonably may be believed to express the fact.' 2 '
The compulsive influence of the vested-rights theory is nowhere more
dramatically illustrated than in the fact that the American Law Institute,
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the American
Bar Association unite in telling us that the law designated by the choice-oflaw rule is so uncompromisingly indispensable that it may be invoked at any
118. See Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 267, 84 A.2d 725, 728 (1951).

119. See Silveyra v. Harper, 82 Cal. App. 2d 761, 187 P.2d 83 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
120. Nussbaum, supra note 44, at 1037.
121. Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479 (1912).
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stage of the litigation.1 2 2 And from time to time the philosophy is made
explicit in an especially meaningful way:
...
the use of presumptions sometimes results in the application of
the "wrong" law or the "wrong" principles of law, and to the extent
that the rules of choice of law are based upon sound policy this
method of 1determining
the applicable rule by presumption must be
23
deprecated.

While this is a qualified statement, the author evidently assumes that choiceof-law rules are based on sound policy, so that the application of any law
other than that designated by the rules is to be deprecated. But unqualified
statements can also be found:
It would appear that the ultimate objective of the courts and the
Legislature should be to assure to the greatest degree possible, that
when the rules of conflict of laws indicate that a case is governed
by the law of a foreign
jurisdiction, that foreign law is actually ap124
plied to the case.
This is the ultimate. This gives the territorialist theory of vested rights
even greater power and dignity than Holmes himself gave it. To Holmes,
the theory and its consequences were no more than a logical necessity. According to this view, however, the application of the foreign law has become
a matter of high policy. Effectuation of the goal that the designated foreign
law shall be applied becomes nothing less than the "ultimate objective" oi
the courts and the legislature.
This is the place to join the critical issue. I categorically reject this
imperative conception of the choice-of-law rule. Even without the aid of
the local-law theory, it can be demonstrated that such a conception is false
1 25
and dangerous.
122. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 12; see authorities cited notes 91-92 supra.

123. Hartwig, supra note 27, at 180.

124. CAL. LAW REVISION Comm'N, op. cit. supra note 27, at 1-19. However, probably

because of the long-standing practice in California of following the presumption that
foreign law is identical with the law of the forum, the Commission recommended

legislation which provides that, if the court is unable to determine the law of a foreign
country, it may either apply the law of the forum or dismiss without prejudice, as the
ends of justice require. Id. at 1-8; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1875.
125. At the outset, three fairly obvious arguments may be made against the vested-

rights theory in its application to the problem under discussion: (1) The theory is

inconsistent with the fact, recognized by Holmes even as he gave the theory forceful
statement, that the foreign law is ignored where the cause of action arises "in regions
having no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate." Cuba R.R. v.
Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478 (1912), citing American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347 (1909). (2) The foreign conflict-of-laws rule may refer to the law of the
forum, and in some cases even the Restatement tells us that the renvoi should be
accepted. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAw § 8 (1934) ; cf. CooK, op. cit. supra note 2,

at 3-47. (3) Frequently, when the applicable foreign law has been determined, it is
found contrary to the public policy of the forum and rejected. Union Trust Co. v.
Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918). When this happens, it is ordinarily the law of the forum
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The imperative conception attributes to the choice-of-law rule a policy
content of far greater importance than is normally attributed to the municipal
laws of the forum. This is a strange inversion of values. A choice-of-law
rule is an empty and bloodless thing. Actually, instead of declaring an overriding public policy, it proclaims the state's indifference to the result of the
litigation. Let there be a domestic case of tort or contract, and the law of
the state points to the result which alone can advance the social and economic
policy embodied in that law. Let a conventionally suitable foreign factor
be injected and the state immediately loses interest. Normal governmental
policies are forgotten. In their place there is substituted a policy of a different kind. A choice-of-law rule does express a policy, but it is not of
the same order as the social and economic policies which are normally developed by a state in the pursuit of its governmental interests and the interest
of its people. Viewed in the most favorable light, the policy is that the state,
as a member of the community of states, will join in a fairly general movement which imposes a degree of restraint upon its sovereignty and upon
the pursuit of its selfish interests, to the end that the result of a case will
not depend capriciously upon where it happens to be brought and that
expectations founded upon one system of law will not be frustrated by
the application of another. 12 6 This is but a mild, tentative, and self-denying
policy. It implies the yielding, from time to time, of specific governmental
policies for the sake of a general legal order. The imperative conception of
the choice-of-law rule leads to a quite unacceptable paradox: the highest
priority is to be given to that rather general and diffident policy which requires that specific, carefully formulated social and economic policies be subordinated to the contrary policies of a foreign state.
I do not exaggerate when I say that the imperative concept, especially
as it has been developed in the judicial notice statutes, gives the highest
priority to that one class of laws which, of all classes, has least to do with
furthering the governmental interests of the state. The applicability of the
foreign law is unwaivable; indeed, it is inescapable except in the adventitious
-or conspiratorial-event that all parties, the judge, and the appellate court
concur in ignoring the choice-of-law rule and the foreign law, and persist
that is applied. See Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56
CoLu&. L. REv. 969 (1956). This third point in particular should emphasize the
incongruity of the suggestion that application of the foreign law is a high policy goal of
the forum.
126. See Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 56 YAr.E L.J. 1155, 1159
(1947). In addition, I suppose, the policy can be viewed as one of economy in judicial
administration. The choice-of-law rule provides a convenient rule of thumb for the
expeditious disposition of perplexing cases. See CARozo, THIE PARADOXES OF LEGAL
SCIENCE 67 (1928) ; Cavers, Book Review, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1170 (1943).
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in their blindness until the case has been irrevocably terminated. 127 Few
domestic laws, no matter how clear and important their policy content, have
such ineluctable force.
A Statute of Frauds, or a statute of limitations, expresses a policy ;128
yet the reader will hardly require a citation of authority for the familiar proposition that a party waives the protection of such statutes by failing to plead
them. Through the centuries an important governmental policy has been
thunderously reiterated: it is in the interest of the state that there be an end
to litigation. Yet a party must invoke a former judgment and must sustain
the burden of establishing that it is conclusive of the issues. 12 9 The Uniform
Rules of Evidence themselves provide that there shall be no relief against the
erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence unless the aggrieved party takes
timely steps at the trial to invoke the protection of the rules. 3 0° If we are
wise, we provide that even when a judge fails to instruct the jury with
respect to applicable principles of domestic law, or gives an erroneous instruction, there must be a timely objection at the trial; when we fail so to provide,
the results are chaotic.' 31 It is difficult to conceive how a state can have any
more important interest than the effectuation of the provisions of its constitution; yet strict rules as to the time and manner in which constitutional questions must be raised have time after time precluded the disposition of cases in
accordance with constitutional principles. 8 2 Indeed, it is generally true that
the policies embodied in "private" law are neither self-executing nor enforced
by public functionaries. They must be invoked by private parties. A contract
provision exonerating a party from liability for his own negligence may be
contrary to public policy because the state wishes to "discourage negligence
by making wrongdoers pay damages,"' 133 but, if the injured person chooses
127. I am referring here, of course, primarily to the judicial notice provisions of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, discussed at notes 46-103 supra and accompanying text.
128. Though it is difficult to say what the respective policies are for the purposes

of conflict of laws.

129. See RESTATIEENT, JUDG21ENTS §§ 49, comment c, 68, comments k, 1 (1942);
BLumE, AmFRICAN CivI PROCEUn 85-86 (1955); C-ARIuc, CODE PLEADING 611-12
(2d ed. 1947).
130. UNIEoRmu RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 4-5.
131. See Paschal, A Plea for a Return to Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedurein North Carolina,36 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1957).
132. See Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935); DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 171-73 (5th ed. 1954) ; cf. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313
(1958).
Although it has been said that constitutional doctrine requires the application of
state law by federal courts under the Erie doctrine, and although there is no federal

"law of the forum" which can logically be resorted to in default of a showing of state

law, "Mr. Justice Brandeis himself indicated that the parties could, in effect, substitute
federal 'general' law for the applicable law of the appropriate state simply by relying
'almost exclusively on federal precedents.'" Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The
Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine it Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 191 (1957),
citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113 n.1 (1938).
133. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 91 (1955). My reference to this
decision does not imply uncritical acceptance of its rationale. See Comment, 24 U. Cux.
L. REv.315 (1957).
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to honor his contract and suffer his loss, nothing is done about it. And it is
the general rule that a party ordinarily cannot complain of the judge's failure
34
to apply domestic law-even domestic statutes-not called to his attention.
Of course, I do not mean that private law does not embody governmental
policies, or that the policies are unimportant. On the contrary. The point
is simply that we rely on the initiative and self-interest of litigants to invoke
the laws and thus effectuate the policies. Under our free enterprise system of
law, the party who wishes the benefit of a law or policy must invoke it; and
he must do so at such a time and in such a manner that his opponent has a
fair and full opportunity to meet the challenge in all its aspects. Such provisions to insure fairness will sometimes result in the deflection or frustration
of the policy, but they are indispensable. Without them the competitive system
of free enterprise by which governmental policy is effectuated would break
down.
It is difficult to believe that a mere jurisprudential theory, devised to
explain the phenomenon of a court's applying foreign law, could have been
responsible for such a revolutionary difference in the rule concerning the
occasion upon which foreign law becomes material, and for the extraordinary
status which has been accorded the choice-of-law rule and the foreign law.
Probably there were a number of contributory causes, some of which may be
mentioned here.
First, it seems likely that the extraordinary status of foreign law has
resulted in part from the treatment of foreign law together with propositions
of fact which are susceptible of judicial notice. Rule 9 of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence covers not only judicial notice of foreign law but also, according
to the same scheme, other matters, such as "specific facts and propositions of
generalized knowledge ... so universally known that they cannot reasonably
be the subject of dispute," and facts "which are capable of immediate and
accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable
accuracy." So far as I am able to judge, the rule that a court may take judicial
notice of such matters at any stage of the litigation is not likely to result in
procedural injustice so long as the parties are given the notice and opportunity
to be heard provided by rule 10. But the importation of foreign law into a
134. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 304. But see Comment, 30 YALE L.J. 855
(1921). Professor Morgan, Reporter for the Model Code of Evidence, has a different view,
or a different emphasis, which perhaps accounts for the wide latitude he would give to

judicial notice of sister-state law: "Hence, except where the prohibition against reversal
for invited error applies, it is usually held to be reversible error for the trial judge to over-

look or misapply an applicable statutory or common law rule, or to disregard or deny
accepted and well-known propositions of generalized knowledge." MODEL CODE OF
at 65-66 (1942). It is not necessary, in this article, to determine the precise
extent to which domestic law overlooked at the trial may be invoked in later proceedings
in the case. Enough has been said to make it clear that the provisions of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence regarding judicial notice of foreign law would give foreign law in
EVIDENCE

general a more imperative quality than is ordinarily given to domestic law.
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case at a late stage may have an effect which the importation of a fact is
unlikely to produce: the rule of decision may be changed; the assumptions on
which the case has been tried may be destroyed; new standards may be erected
which may not be met by the case which has been made. Judicial notice of a
fact tends to fill a gap in a chain of reasoning. Judicial notice of foreign law
for the purpose of finding the rule of decision may substitute a wholly new
frame of reference and destroy the chain of reasoning.
Second, it is very clear that the early view, according to which the law
of the forum provided the rule of decision until it was displaced by an
interested party's invocation of foreign law, suffered its first severe reverses
because it would have resulted in a more extensive application of wrongful
death statutes, toward which the courts exhibited undisguised hostility. Distaste for the law of the forum made the courts reluctant to apply that law
to foreign incidents even when the foreign law had not been invoked; accordingly, they required the plaintiff to prove the foreign law as an essential ele135
ment of his cause of action.
Finally, the relinquishment of the problem to the domain of evidence
led to its statement in terms of allocation of the burden of proof. In an early
and very influential article, Kales criticized the rule that the law of the forum
governs until the foreign law is made to appear:
From the point of certainty it may be admitted that it is a good rule.
It is submitted, however, that it throws an unjust burden upon the
one who has not naturally the burden of going forward with evidence.
Thus, suppose the law of Chili governed in an action in Illinois
against a surety, and the defendant claims a discharge because of the
giving of time to the principal debtor. According to [this] ...

view,

although the burden of proof of the whole of the defense of the giving
of time is upon the defendant, yet the plaintiff must go to the expense and trouble of going forward in the first instance with evidence
tending to prove that by the law of Chili there is no such defense,
when the probabilities are all in favor of the fact that that position
is the correct one. The defendant who naturally has the burden of
going forward with proof of the foreign law as part of his defense
can rest without any expense or trouble, and if the plaintiff fails to
135. See Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861); Crowley v. Panama R.R
30 Barb. 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859) ; Vandeventer v. New York & N.H.R.R., 27 Barb. 244
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857). The fact that the Panama Railroad was a New York corporation,
and the deceased and the plaintiff apparently New York residents, made no difference to
the courts in the cases brought against that railroad. In one case, however, the Supreme
Court held that whether the New York wrongful death statute gave protection to citizens
of New York for injuries inflicted beyond its territory was a question which depended
upon the intention of the legislature. Beach v. Bay State Co., 27 Barb. 248 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1858); cf. Universal Credit Co. v. Marks, 164 Md. 130, 136, 163 At. 810, 812 (1933).
And in a not very clear-cut decision the Supreme Court of Utah held the Utah wrongful
death statute applicable to an injury in Idaho in the absence of a showing of Idaho law,
indulging in the presumption that foreign law was the same as that of the forum. Grow v.
Oregon Short Line R.R., 44 Utah 160, 138 Pac. 398 (1914).
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produce evidence as to the law of Chili proving a negative, the
defendant must prevail. 36
There are several difficulties in this argument. For example, one might
ask why the plaintiff was not required in the first place to prove the Chilean
law in order to make out a prima facie case. 137 Again, although the passage
refers twice to the party "naturally" having the burden of going forward, that
burden is not assigned according to natural principles. Apart from the fact
that we "naturally" require a plaintiff to make a certain minimum showing
(the level of which is a matter of judgment) before calling upon the defendant
to make a defense, we assign the burden either arbitrarily or in accordance
with merely human considerations of convenience and fairness. Again, the
intimation that it is unfair to impose on a party the burden of establishing a
negative proposition, if it ever has any validity, is certainly a red herring
where foreign law is concerned. The question is simply: what are the revelant
provisions of the foreign law? Finally, and of most importance, the argument
begs the question. The fundamental question is not a matter of burden of
proof at all. Kales assumed, in line with the vested-rights theory, that the
foreign law is an essential element of a cause of action or defense. Given
that premise, there remains only a question of burden of proof, and of whether
the presumptions improperly shift the burden. But the fundamental question
concerns the function of a choice-of-law rule. If such a rule, instead of
designating the law of the one state having jurisdiction to determine the
legal consequences of a transaction, is regarded as permitting an interested
party to invoke the foreign law as a guide to the court in shaping the remedy
to the facts of the particular case, there is no question of burden of proof
and no unfairness in requiring the interested party to invoke the foreign
law which will prompt the court to depart from its usual and familiar practices.
The rule favoring the law of the forum until a different law is invoked
by an interested party seems overwhelmingly preferable to the converse rule,
applied in the Crosby and Walton cases, even when the converse rule is
buffered with presumptions which partially avoid its harsh results.

136. Kales, supra note 18, at 412-13. See also 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 622A.2,
at 1681 (1935). A fourth contributing cause may have been the failure to distinguish
between reference to the foreign law as the source of the rule of decision and references
for other purposes. See notes 138-70 infra and accompanying text.
137. Kales's answer would be that the plaintiff was aided by the "rudimentary principles" presumption, Kales, supra note 18, at 409, which some would regard as not different
in effect from a presumption favoring the law of the forum, and that the burden which
would otherwise have rested upon the plaintiff was thus shifted to the defendant. But the
defendant could not be aided by a similar presumption, because the rule as to the effect of
extending time to the principal debtor is "an illogical and irrational extreme." Id. at 410.
Kales himself recognized the limitations of the rudimentary-principle presumption. Id.

at 409.
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VII. THE FUNCTIONS OF FOREIGN LAW
Unfortunately, although it is clearly preferable to the rule followed in
Crosby and Walton, a simple rule that the law of the forum will be applied
until foreign law is invoked and established by an interested party will not
yield satisfactory results in all cases. This can be illustrated by Walton itself.
That case, it will be remembered, grew out of a head-on collision. The plaintiff
contended that the defendant's truck was on the wrong side of the road. How
is the court to determine which is the wrong side? By reference to the rule
of the road laid down by the law of New York? Conceivably, we might take
the position, even here, that it is not unjust to proceed in accordance with the
law of the forum until the defendant establishes that the law of the place of
injury is different. If the defendant's employee was keeping to the left because
that is the rule of the road in Saudi Arabia, the defendant should have little
difficulty in establishing the law on which its employee relied. Nevertheless,
there is something distasteful about such an attitude. We all know that the
rule of the road varies from place to place. It is perfectly apparent that the
rule in New York is not intended to have any application to Saudi Arabia,
but is designed solely to regulate traffic on the streets and highways of New
York. We instinctively recoil from even the prima facie application to foreign
events of a rule so pointedly local in its purpose.
Consider the instructive case of Hill v. Wilker,13 8 an action in Georgia
on a promissory note. The defendant pleaded that the note was made on
Sunday. The evidence showed that the note had been given in Kansas; there
was no evidence as to the law of Kansas, although there was some suggestion
that there was no organized government there. The Georgia court, holding
the note void, declared:
... in the absence of proof to the contrary, the legal presumption is,
that the lex loci is the same as our own. We are sustained in this
presumption by the fact that a contrary view would suppose the
people of Kansas to have annulled the decalogue, and to have permitted by law the disregard of christian obligation, and not only
forgotten but violated the injunction, "Remember the Sabbath day to
keep it holy; on it thou shalt do no manner of work."139
Perhaps the most understanding interpretation of this decision is that the
Georgia court was applying divine law-a law which admits of no limitations
of territory or governmental purpose, but applies to all men everywhere. The
fact remains that the court was announcing the rule that the law of the forum
applies until it is displaced by some interested party's timely invocation of a
138. 41 Ga. 449 (1871).
139. Id. at 453.
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relevant foreign law (or, what amounts to the same thing for practical purposes, the presumption that the foreign law is identical with that of the forum).
We, too, shall be forced to the same result if we adopt without qualification
the view that the law of the forum governs until it is displaced by a showing
of what the foreign law is.
But such a result is, of course, intolerable. The Georgia law which invalidates Sunday contracts has no rational application to transactions entered
into in Kansas. This is true even though we are ignorant of the Kansas law.
It is true even though we accept the suggestion that there was no organized
government and no law on the mining frontier of Kansas - despite the fact
that Holmes himself would have countenanced resort to "the law of the
forum" in dealing with events in uncivilized territory. 1 40 Georgia invalidates
domestic Sunday contracts because (1) the criminal laws of the state prohibit the pursuit of one's ordinary calling on that day, and (2) the courts
have decided that, in addition to the penal sanctions provided by statute, a
contract made in violation of the prohibition should be made unenforceable. 14'
But the Georgia court would hardly have taken the position that the parties,
in entering into this transaction in Kansas, had committed an offense against
the criminal laws of Georgia. 142 Other courts have also struggled with the
problem of contracts made abroad on Sunday, where the foreign law is not
made to appear. The Supreme Court of Vermont took a more sophisticated
view of the scope of its Sunday laws than did the Georgia court. 143 The Vermont court thought that their sole purpose was to protect the community in
the quiet enjoyment of religious feelings and devotions; hence, a contract
entered into in another state could not be a violation of the Vermont statute.
There is simply no excuse for applying the laws of the forum to invalidate a
contract made on Sunday in another state, even though the foreign law is
not brought to the attention of the court.
We are forced to the conclusion that some parts of the law of the forum
may be displaced not only by a party's invocation of a foreign law which
140. Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478 (1912). Even if we knew that Kansas

law also prohibited the transaction of business on Sunday, there would seem to be no reason

why Georgia should impose the sanction of invalidity, thus "enforcing the penal laws" of
another jurisdiction. See CooK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 428-29.
141. See id. at 427-28.
142. This is true even though it happens that both parties were Georgia residents
at the time. The court gave that circumstance no weight and would doubtless have
found uncongenial the "cosmopolitan principle" whereby a state may punish its citizens
(or, for that matter, others) for acts abroad which, if committed within the state,
would be punishable. See id. at 14-15; cf. id. at 430: "When we recall that the invalidity
of Sunday contracts is a consequence attached by courts to criminal statutes, it is obvious
that the notes in question could not be invalid under Massachusetts 'law,' since they
were signed and delivered in New York, and the Massachusetts criminal statute did not
and could not apply to them." (Emphasis added.)
143. Adams v. Gay, 19 Vt. 358 (1847). See also O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 43 Mich.

58 (1880).
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is entitled to preference, but also (tentatively, at least) by a demonstration
that the forum's law, properly construed in the light of the policy which
that law embodies and the interest of the forum state in effectuating that
policy, 44 has no application to the case before the court. To return to the
Walton case, whether or not the defendant establishes to the satisfaction of
the court the rule of the road in Saudi Arabia, the rule of the road which
is found in the law of New York should not be applied. It should be sufficient
for the defendant simply to point out that the New York rule was not intended
to apply, and cannot reasonably be applied, outside New York.
But if this is true of the rule of the road, is it not also true of the rest
of the law of NewYork? Personal injuries, and in particular those arising
from automobile accidents, give rise to social and economic problems. The
law of New York, particularly the law of torts and of agency, expresses a
governmental policy with respect to those problems. But New York has an
interest in the application of this policy only where its relation to the event
or to the parties is such as to bring the matter within the reach of the state's
legitimate governmental concerns. New York does not presume to make
laws to bind the whole world. New York would be concerned, and would
have an interest in applying its law and policy, if the injury bad occurred
in that state. It would likewise be concerned, and would have an interest
in applying its law and policy, if the injured person were a resident of, or
domiciled in, New York. 1 45 It is difficult to perceive what interest it has
in applying its social and economic policy where the injury occurred in Saudi
Arabia, where the injured person was and is a resident of Arkansas, and
where the defendant is a Delaware corporation.'4 0 Indeed, this is a type of
case which the New York courts will ordinarily decline to adjudicate (even
if the appropriate party is prepared to prove the applicable foreign law), in
47
accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The situation would be different if both parties-or even the plaintiff
alone-were residents of, or domiciled in, New York. In that event, New
-144. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
25 U. Cm. L. REv. 227 (1958); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus
Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958).
145. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) ; Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur.
Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) ; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493 (1939); Comment, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 515 (1956).
146. The fact that the defendant was licensed to do business in New York does
not seem sufficient basis for the assertion of an interest. The policy is probably not one
of punishing wrongdoers, but of securing compensation for the victim; the imposition of
liability (especially of vicarious liability) on the defendant seems but a corollary of the
purpose to provide compensation.
The Erie doctrine apparently precludes treatment of the case on the basis that both
parties are domiciliaries or nationals of the forum (the United States). See note 2
supra; note 149 infra.
147. See Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law,
29 CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1929).
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York would have a definite and legitimate interest in the application of its
policy. Failure of its courts to apply New York law will mean that the
injured party may be unable to obtain compensation from the tort-feasor,
with the result that he may become a burden upon other residents of New
York, or upon the state itself. A strong case can be made for the proposition
that the state which is the domicile of the parties (or of the plaintiff alone)
should apply its own law of personal injuries, even where the law of the
place of injury is established and does not provide for recovery.' 48 Surely
it would be reasonable for the state in which the injured plaintiff resides to
apply its own law, and hence further its own governmental policies, when
no other law is established, and when, therefore, no conflict is made to
149
appear.
If this view is accepted, there remains the question of how a New York
court, or a federal court in New York, should dispose of cases in which it
is clear that New York has no interest in applying its social and economic
policy, i.e., those cases in which the injury occurred elsewhere and the plaintiff is neither domiciled in, nor a resident of, New York. In some of these,
it would seem entirely reasonable for the court to entertain a motion to
dismiss, without prejudice, 150 on grounds substantially the same as those
which underlie the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Thus, if both
the plaintiff and the defendant are Saudi Arabians, having no connection
with New York, the customary grounds for invoking the doctrine of forum
non conveniens exist, and there is the added ground that the parties have
not made available to the court any body of law which seems particularly
appropriate to the controversy. The same is true where, as in Walton, the
plaintiff is domiciled in a third state and the defendant in a fourth. In this
connection it must be emphasized that the choice-of-law rule which points to
the state of injury as the only one having "jurisdiction" to determine the
148. See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict
of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958) ; cf. Morris, The ProperLaw of a Tort, 64 HAv.
L. REv. 881 (1951); Morris, Torts in the Conflict of Laws, 12 MODERN L. REv. 248

(1949); Note, 75 S.A.L.J. 104 (1958). See also Scott v. Lord Seymour, 1 Hurl. & C.
219, 234, 158 Eng. Rep. 865, 872 (Ex. 1862) ; Wachtell, supra note 27.
An interesting parallel is furnished by the application of the Jones Act to Americanowned vessels registered abroad, and to injuries to American seamen on foreign vessels.
See Gn.morm & BLAcK,

ADmiRALTY

§ 6-64 (1957).

In the federal realm of admiralty, of

course, American citizenship or domicile carries a significance which it does not enjoy
in the realm of Erie.
149. In the Crosby case the plaintiff was a resident of Tennessee and the defendant
a New Jersey corporation. Since a general federal common law was recognized at that
time, the case might well have been decided in accordance with the law of the common
domicile of the parties.
150. See Nussbaum, supra note 44, at 1036 & n.108; cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
§§ 49, 52-53 (1942). In Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp., 245 N.Y. 152, 154, 156 N.E. 647, 648

(1927), the dismissal was expressly made a final determination on the merits; and the
parties to the Walton case seem to have gone out of their way to achieve that result
by means of a directed verdict. Brief for Appellant, app. pp. 30, 47. See also CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 1875 (9).
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legal consequences of the event is regrettably rigid and oversimplified. A
more rational system of conflict of laws would permit reference to the law
of any state having an interest in the matter. If this were possible, the
Walton case might have been tried under the laws of Arkansas or Delaware,
in the absence of information as to Saudi Arabian law, with the probability
that no provision of the law of either state would have precluded recovery.
Taking the choice-of-law rule as it stands, however, it would not be unreasonable for the court to consider dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds. 151
This, however, will not be an appropriate disposition in many instances,
and it probably would not have been so in Walton. The doctrine of forum
non conveniens is "an instrument of justice."'152 It will ordinarily not be
applied where the effect will be to deprive the plaintiff of all remedy, or even
of some advantages not unfairly gained by the choice of forum. 5 3 To dismiss
the action of an American citizen against an American corporation, when no
other available forum except possibly Saudi Arabia appears to be in any
better position to decide the case in accordance with an appropriate law, does
not appeal to the sense of justice. 15 4 Moreover, there are certain cases which
are rather clearly not subject to dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds,
notwithstanding the fact that New York has no interest in the application of
its legal policy. These are the cases in which the defendant is domiciled in
New York and the plaintiff is either a resident of another American state
or of a foreign country. An action brought against the defendant at his own
domicile is not an appropriate, or at least not a typical, case for dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds. Now, New York has no particular interest
in holding its own people liable for injuries to foreigners. On the contrary,
if it were to adopt an attitude of extreme selfishness, it might prefer not
to do so. But, as we have noted, if the action were brought by a resident of
New York, the court should, according to the argument in this article, apply
New York law in the absence of information as to foreign law. To do that,
and to refuse to do the same where the action is brought by a citizen of a
sister state, would be to raise a serious question under the privileges and
151. In the federal court, transfer, if possible, would be substituted for dismissal.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952). Transfer of the Walton case to the district of the
plaintiff's residence in Arkansas would have been an ideal solution, since in that event
Arkansas law might have been applied as the law of the forum, relevant because of the
plaintiff's domicile there. Presumably, however, the defendant was not amenable to
process in Arkansas, so that that was not a district in which the action "might have
been brought," and so not a district to which the action could be transferred. FosterMilburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950).
152. See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 151 (1933) (Cardozo, J,,
dissenting) ; Note, 58 CoLum. L. Ray. 234 (1958).
153. See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Ci.
L. RE.v
405, 433, 448 (1955), and authorities cited.
154. See Comment, 25 U. Cur. L. REv. 377 (1958).
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immunities clause.155 While the constitutional difficulty would not be present
if the action were brought by an alien, American legal tradition has in general
shunned such discrimination; and there is no reason, in fact, to imagine
that New York, or any other American state, would desire to discriminate
in such fashion against either an alien or a citizen of a sister state.
In short, there will be a number of cases which, for one reason or another,
the court should not dismiss even though it recognizes that it has available
no body of law which can be said to be appropriate in terms of the legal
policy of any interested state. What should the court do with these cases?
It should decide them in accordance with the law of the forum. But it should
not apply mechanically all of that law. For example, New York should never
apply the law of the forum to determine the rule of the road in Saudi Arabia.
And a court should never apply the Sunday laws of the forum to invalidate
a contract made abroad.
These declarations require an explanation. If we approach the problem
of conflict of laws in terms of the social and economic policies of the states
involved, and in terms of the interests of those states in having their policies
applied in a particular case, how can we justify resort to the law of a state
which admittedly has no interest in the application of its policy to the case
at hand? And how do we distinguish between those portions of the law of
the forum which are to be applied and those which are not? Thus far, we
have suggested only that the process of construction-i.e., of inquiry into
the extent to which a law is "intended" to apply to cases not wholly domestic
-will reveal clearly that a particular rule, such as the rule of the road, has
no application to the case at hand. But by the same process it becomes
equally clear that the forum's rules of torts and agency have no application.
Law is an instrument of social control. Recognition of this fact, and
emphasis on the economic and social policies expressed in laws, would lead
to a fresh and constructive approach to conflict-of-laws problems. But law is
not an instrument of social control alone. It retains something of the quality
and function which were commonly attributed to it before we became so
acutely conscious of its sociological role. It is an accumulated body of experience and principle which has served well, on the whole, as a guide to the
155. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021
(1920), writ of errordismissed, 255 U.S. 445 (1921). While the reasoning of this decision
is open to question, cf. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929);
La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919), it may have greater validity when the
question relates to dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens than when it relates
to choice of the applicable law.
In this light, a transfer of the Walton case to Delavare, the domicile of the
defendant, might have been an excellent disposition. On our hypothesis, Delaware
would have applied its own law in an action by one of its citizens against the local
corporation in the absence of a showing of the Saudi Arabian law, and it might be
required to do the same in an action by a citizen of another state.
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adjudication of disputes between parties in court. Grant that no governmental
policy of New York respecting the problem of personal injuries will be
advanced by the application of its law to a dispute between two foreigners
arising out of a collision in Saudi Arabia; grant also that neither party regulated his conduct or planned his affairs with reference to New York law. The
fact remains that there is a lawsuit pending in a New York court. The harsh
alternative to deciding it according to New York law is to dismiss it. No
conflict of interest among states being apparent, justice between the parties
becomes the sole consideration. Justice between the parties requires a decision
on the merits. And where should the New York court look for a rule of
decision which will do justice between the parties but to the body of principle
and experience which has served that purpose, as well as the ends of governmental policy, for the people of New York in their domestic affairs?
Few courts have ever been willing to apply every jot and tittle of the
domestic law to a foreign case in the absence of any showing of the foreign
law. Various attempts have been made to rationalize the distinction between
those portions of domestic law which can be suitably applied in the adjudication
of the dispute and those which are felt to be unsuitable. One way, which
would surely not be satisfactory today, is to draw the line between common
law and legislation. The courts which were willing to presume that the
foreign law was the same as the common, but not the statutory, law of the
forum were not merely expressing hostility toward legislation. They were
expressing belief that that portion of the law of the forum which consisted of
the product of judicial reasoning and experience in the adjudication of cases
was a reservoir of wisdom and justice which could be fairly drawn upon in
any case, at least in the absence of a showing of foreign law, whereas
legislation was likely to be fraught with political considerations, and hence
suitable for domestic application alone. We realize now, of course, that the
common law itself is an instrument of social and economic policy; and few
would contend now that abstract justice could be done between the parties
to a case without recognizing a right of action for wrongful death, so widespread is the acceptance of what was once a most hateful and "local" intrusion
upon the "natural justice" of the common law. Courts which have adopted
the position that the law of the forum will be applied in the absence of a
showing of foreign law have commonly modified the generality of that view by
excluding local laws which provide for "penalties and forfeitures." Nussbaum,
in his strong advocacy of that position, recognized that there must be a limit
to such employment of the law of the forum. He suggested that, just as
the doctrine of local public policy places a limit on the extent to which foreign
law is applied, so a counterpart of that doctrine limits the extent to which
156. Nussbaum, supra note 44, at 1040.
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1 56
local law is applied in the absence of information as to the foreign law.
He was particularly troubled by the application of local law in the context
157
In
of "rights originating in foreign familial and inheritance relations.'
the end, he could offer nothing more precise than the suggestion that, in
the absence of foreign law, "a court should apply its own law when substantial
158
justice can thereby be attained."'
One could wish to improve upon the definiteness of this formulation,
and I think there is one further suggestion of an analytical type which may
be helpful. I do not offer it as a dramatic and sovereign solution to the
problem of distinguishing between the local law that may appropriately be
applied and that which may not, for I think that such a solution may prove
to be unattainable. It does, however, account for the troublesome cases
which have come to my attention, and it points to a consideration which
should never be overlooked when the problem of recourse to foreign law is
under discussion-especially when the doctrine of judicial notice is invoked
in that connection.
For what purpose do we refer to the law of a foreign state? We do so
for various different purposes, some of which have nothing to do with
conflict of laws, and some of which have nothing to do with the central problem
of conflict of laws. That problem is to find the appropriate rule of decision
when the interests of two or more states are potentially involved. But on
many occasions we refer to foreign law not to find a rule of decision, but
for a quite different purpose. This is clearest when we do not make use of
choice-of-law rules at all. For example, a case otherwise wholly domestic
may involve mistake of foreign law. No choice-of-law rule refers the court
to the law of a foreign state; all significant contacts are with the forum, and the
law of the forum furnishes the rule of decision. There is no question of
conflict of laws. The tenor of the foreign law must be ascertained, however,
if the fact of mistake is to be established. To apply the law of the forum in the
absence of a showing of foreign law would simply be irrational. But the
purpose of the reference to the foreign law in this case has nothing to do with
conflict of laws. 1 9 The devolution of land may depend upon whether the law

157. Id. at 1041.

158. Id. at 1042.
159. See Haven v. Foster, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 112 (1829). This old case was
selected out of the large pumber of available illustrations because it is the first in a

section entitled "The Nafure of the Foreign Law," in 1 BEALE,

CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF

LAWS 127 (1st ed. 1900). The failure to distinguish the different functions of references
to foreign law has deep roots.
On the other hand, Thayer seems to have appreciated the need for making the
distinction: "[I]f the factum of domestic law is for the court, equally the factum of
foreign law should be, - assuming it to be true that it is wanted, in order to determine
the rule or law of the case." THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
(Emphasis added.) Observe also the use of the expression
COmMoN LAW 258 (1898).
"rule of decision" in the quotations in the text at notes 106, 114 mupra.
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of the alien heir's homeland would permit inheritance by Americans.1 0 Yet
the "applicable law"-the law which furnishes the rule of decision-is of
course the law of the forum and situs. The reference to the alien law has
nothing to do with conflict of laws, but merely supplies a datum which is
rendered material by the rule of decision which is found in the law of the
forum. Cases such as these are frequently cited in discussions of the consequences of failure by the appropriate party to establish the foreign law, with
no recognition of the fact that they are clearly distinguishable from cases
presenting problems in the choice of law.161
The thesis of this article has no relevance to the foreign law element in
cases such as these. The problem under discussion here concerns the course
of action to be taken by a court when, according to a domestic choice-of-law
rule, the rule of decision is to be found in a foreign law which is not invoked
in timely and appropriate fashion. The thesis that in these circumstances the
court should employ the rule of decision found in the law of the forum is
bottomed upon my interpretation of the typical function of a choice-of-law
rule, and is not transferable to cases in which no choice-of-law rule is involved.
The comments made on the utility of judicial notice in establishing foreign
law are similarly limited. I am not at all sure that when a man is prosecuted
as an habitual offender and prior convictions of felony in another state are
charged, the prosecution should not be required to establish by formal proof,
to the satisfaction of the jury, all provisions of foreign law necessary to
sustain the charge.16 2 That is a question beyond the scope of an article on
the conflict of laws. The point is that it is dangerous to lump together, without
regard to the functional differences involved, all problems of pleading and
160. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (Supp. 1955); see Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal. 2d 573,
191 P.2d 747 (1948).
161. A much-cited decision, and one which may have had an appreciable effect
on the development of the New York law which was decisive in Walton, is Crashley v.
Press Publishing Co., 179 N.Y. 27, 71 N.E. 258 (1904). This was an action for libel
growing out of the publication in New York of an article charging that the plaintiff had
participated in a revolutionary effort in Brazil. New York was treated as the "place of
wrong," the New York law of libel furnished the rule of decision, and no problem of the
conflict of laws was involved. New York law, however, required a showing of special
damages if the published matter was not libelous per se, which it would be if it charged
commission of a crime of a certain class. This raises, in the first place, a problem of
interpretation of the New York law: a crime under the law of New York, or of the
country in which the conduct occurred? Having decided, or assumed, that this meant
the foreign law, the court concluded that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish
that the offense was a crime under the laws of Brazil, and rather naturally refused to
assume for this purpose that the laws of Brazil were identical with those of New
York. But the case has nothing to do with conflict of laws and has no relevance to
the problem of what a court should do when the foreign law which theoretically should
furnish the rule of decision is not made to appear. See Bradley v. Mutual Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 3 Lans. 341 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870) ; cf. Banco de Sonora v. Bankers' Mut. Cas.
Co., 124 Iowa 576, 100 N.W. 532 (1903).
162. See People v. Morton, 41 Cal. 2d 536, 261 P.2d 523 (1953); cf. Smith v.
Hays, 10 F.2d 145 (8th Cir. 1925); State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600
(1951).
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proof of foreign law, of presumptions and judicial notice of foreign law, and
of the consequences of failure of timely information concerning such law.
I would earnestly commend this thought to the consideration, in particular,
of those who draft statutes on judicial notice of foreign law.
In a typical conflict-of-laws case, such as Walton, when we are referred
by a choice-of-law rule to the law of a foreign state, the purpose is to find the
appropriate rule of decision. We are not seeking those provisions of foreign
law which, given the appropriate rule of decision, may affect the outcome of
the case, as in the purely domestic cases which we have just been discussing
where foreign law may affect the outcome although the rule of decision is found
in the law of the forum. And when, in default of information as to the foreign
law, we resort to the law of the forum faute de mieux, it is for the same
purpose: to find an appropriate rule of decision. 163 In this light, it should
be clear why the court, having failed to find the rule of decision in the law
referred to by the choice-of-law rule and having decided to resort to the law
of the forum, should not apply the forum's rule of the road or its Sunday laws.
The rule of the road is not a rule of decision but a rule of conduct. There are
rules of decision which say that negligence is the want of due care and that
due care requires adherence to apposite rules of conduct. These rules of
decision the law of the forum can supply, there being before the court no
competing rule and no conflict with the interest of a foreign state. But the
rule of conduct, at least when it is a rule of the road, can be found only in
the law of the state where the conduct occurred.16 4 The rule which prohibits
163. I am not altogether happy with this terminology. The phrase, "rule of decision,"
is best known because of its employment in the Judiciary Act § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (1789), and
the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1952). In that context, it suggests a distinction
between substantive rules and rules of procedure. Here, of course, I am primarily
suggesting a distinction between kinds of substantive law, or between the different
purposes for which substantive law is employed.
A helpful analogy may be found in cases on the problem of what constitutes a case
"arising under" federal law for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of federal
district courts. A plaintiff bases his contention of negligence on the fact that the
defendant railroad failed to comply with the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The case
is not one "arising under" federal law. It is state law which gives the plaintiff a right
of action for negligence and determines the extent of that right. Federal law furnishes
a standard of conduct which may be relevant, or even decisive; but it is state law that
furnishes the rule of decision. Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 206 F.2d 153
(1st Cir. 1953); Andersen v. Bingham & G. Ry., 169 F.2d 328 (10th Cir. 1948); cf.

note 159 supra.

164. Except that perhaps it may be ascertained without referring to any law at all.
In Walton, counsel for the plaintiff was in the difficult position of having to avoid any
reliance whatever on the law of Saudi Arabia and yet having to establish that it was
not his client who was on the wrong side of the road. His solution 'was ingenious. With
the plaintiff on the stand, he first elicited the fact that the vehicle the plaintiff was
driving was an American model with a lefthand drive. Then plaintiff testified that he was

driving on the righthand side and that he had safely passed several vehicles. Brief for
Appellant, app. pp. 35-36. Does not this testimony provide reasonable basis for an
inference that the plaintiff was not violating the Saudi Arabian rule of the road?
Courts sometimes find standards of conduct in laws and regulations which are clearly
not "applicable." See Skibs A/S Jolund v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 250 F.2d 777,
786 (2d Cir. 1957); MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 210-11 (1952).
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the transaction of business on Sunday is likewise a rule of conduct and one
which, by what appears to be the sounder construction, applies only to conduct
within the territorial limits of the state. The forum's rule of decision, which
says that contracts made in violation of its own Sunday laws will not be
enforced, is therefore inoperative with respect to foreign transactions.
Moreover, even choice-of-law rules do not always refer us to the foreign
law for the purpose of selecting among conflicting rules of decision which
suggest competing interests of the states associated with the matter. Sometimes
the reference is for the collateral purpose of ascertaining some datum which
will be relevant in the application of the rule of decision which is unquestionably provided by the law of the forum. This is especially true of rules
referring to the law governing personal status. Except in suits for declaratory
judgments, the determination of status is almost never the ultimate object
of an action. The question is seldom presented in the abstract, but almost
always in the context of a primary question, such as the right to inherit or the
right to letters of administration. In these cases it is often perfectly clear
that the law of the forum supplies the rule of decision for determining the
litigation between the parties; the "choice-of-law" rule, which seems inaptly
named in this role, performs a different function.
Consider, for example, a workmen's compensation proceeding in New
York following the death of an employee. The employer is a New York
enterprise, the injury occurred in New York, the deceased employee and
the claimant have lived in New York as man and wife for many years. This
is a purely domestic case, in the sense that the workmen's compensation law
of that state alone furnishes the rule of decision. The social and economic
policies of New York with regard to industrial injuries are clearly relevant,
and no other state can claim an interest in the application of its contrary
policy. A question may be raised, however, regarding the claimant's status
as widow. Clearly, this calls for interpretation of the New York law. Assuming that the law is tentatively interpreted to mean that in order to qualify
as widow the claimant must have been validly married to the deceased, the
court inquires into the fact of marriage. It appears that many years ago the
parties, who were close relatives, participated in a religious ceremony in Italy,
where both resided, and that thereafter they lived together as husband and
wife. The court then inquires into the "validity" of the marriage. If such a
marriage is in no way offensive to the laws of New York, probably that
should be an end of the matter (though it usually is not). On the other hand,
if, say, the relationship between the parties was such that New York law
would discountenance a local marriage between local residents so related,
the court may wish to inquire further, depending upon its interpretation of
the word "widow" as used in the workmen's compensation statute. It may
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be the policy of New York, for this purpose, to recognize as valid marriages
which were valid when and where they were entered into, although they
would not be regarded as valid if tested by local law. At this point (and
also when it appears that the foreign marriage was inoffensive in terms of
New York's marriage laws) the process of construction of the New York
statute is interrupted by the intrusion of a "choice-of-law" rule pointing to
the law of Italy-the place of celebration and the domicile of the parties at
the time-as the law "governing" the validity of the marriage. This may
give welcome support to the construction process if it turns out that the
marriage was unobjectionable from the standpoint of Italian family law.
But what if it appears that Italian law required a civil ceremony which was
not performed, or that the parties were so related as to be unable to contract
a valid marriage according to Italian law? Because of the fact that the
choice-of-law rule purports to designate the law which "governs the validity"
of the marriage, there may be a tendency to assume that this, too, is an
end of the matter; the claimant cannot be the widow. But this may make
little sense in terms of New York's social and economic policy. The New
York statute might well be construed as including in the category of widows
all those whose marriages were inoffensive to New York's family laws, and
more besides-so that there would be no point in denying compensation to
the claimant, whose marriage was in no way offensive to New York policies,
simply because the union she contracted with the deceased was discountenanced by the Italian law. Moreover, for what purpose would Italy have
considered the marriage invalid? Would it have jailed the parties for living
in adultery? Would it have denied the woman the rights of a lawful wife
in her husband's property? Would it have permitted her, without terminating the union by divorce, to marry another? And what do the answers to
these questions have to do with the question whether she should receive
compensation for the death of her helpmate in New York? Even if we
find that Italy has a workmen's compensation law, and that a person in
the claimant's position would not be entitled to compensation as a widow
under that law, the question before the New York court is not answered.
Italian law cannot supply the rule of decision; there is no Italian law on
the question of the right of a resident of New York to recover compensation
from a New York employer under the New York workmen's compensation
statute. At best, Italian law can inform us that the Italian courts would
have refused to recognize the marriage as valid for this purpose or that, or
for all purposes. With this information in hand, to be evaluated for what
it is worth, the New York court will proceed to determine whether the
claimant is the "widow" within the meaning of the New York statute. It
may be that according to the true construction of the New York statute the
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term "widow" includes the claimant provided only that the couple maintained the relation of husband and wife in good faith.1 65 If so, the Italian
law of marriage is quite irrelevant.""(
The point is made crystal clear by Sutton v. Lieb.167 The wife's Illinois
divorce decree provided alimony so long as she did not remarry. She then
married a divorced man in Nevada, but a New York court subsequently
annulled the marriage on the ground that her second husband's divorce from
his former wife was invalid. When she sought to enforce continued payment
of alimony under the Illinois decree, a force far stronger than any choice-oflaw rule-the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit to the judgments of sister states-compelled Illinois to recognize that her remarriage
was "void." It did not, however, follow that she was entitled to continued
payment of alimony. It was for Illinois to determine the effect of a void
remarriage upon the obligation imposed by the decree. The case was a
domestic case, and the rule of decision was supplied by domestic law. The
invalidity of the foreign marriage, established beyond question by the foreign
annulment decree, was merely a factor to be taken into account.
It will be observed that we have been discussing these cases on the
assumption that the foreign law is made to appear, and so have ventured
beyond the scope of the present problem. It is not my intention to develop
this line of inquiry. The purpose has been only to establish that in this
context the choice-of-law rule performs a function quite different from the
typical function of choosing the rule of decision. In our New York workmen's compensation case the question of what the court should do if the
Italian law of marriage is not established is one which I am not prepared
to answer. The considerations involved are quite different from those
involved in the question of what a New York court or a federal court in
New York should do in a case like Walton. I am certainly not prepared
to say that, in cases such as these, the New York court should simply apply
the law of the forum in the absence of information as to the foreign law, as
I do say in connection with the Walton case. The problem here is complicated by disturbing questions as to what the court should do even if the
foreign law is plainly established. Without a careful study of that whole
165. Cf. Daniels v. Detroit, G.H. & M. Ry., 163 Mich. 468, 474, 128 N.W. 797, 800
(1910) ; 2 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAvs §§ 62.21, 62.22 (1952).
166. The hypothetical case in the text is based on Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div.
181, 254 N.Y. Supp. 439 (3d Dep't 1931). More interesting than the dictum to the
effect that the law of the forum will be applied in the absence of proof of the foreign
law, id. at 185, 254 N.Y. Supp. at 444, is the court's treatment of the conflicting "expert"
testimony, evincing a laudable determination to decide the case in accordance with New
York policy notwithstanding the Italian law of marriage. Cf. Konieczny v. J. Kresse Co.,
234 App. Div. 517, 256 N.Y. Supp. 275 (3d Dep't 1932).
308 Mass. 450, 32 N.E2d (1941).

But cf. Vergnani v. Guidetti,

167. 342 U.S. 402 (1952).
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problem, it would be rash to propose what the consequences of failure to
establish the foreign law should be. It may be, with respect to all these cases
in which foreign law is referred to, with or without the aid of a choice-of-law
rule, for a purpose other than the typical one of finding the appropriate rule
of decision, that there was wisdom in the old rule that foreign law must be
pleaded and proved, and even that it must be proved to the satisfaction of
the jury. Equally, it may be that some or all of the requirements of the old
rule should be changed, and that the concept of judicial notice may be helpful
for some purposes. I have not given these questions the consideration they
require-and I am sure that the draftsmen of judicial notice statutes have
not done so either, although those statutes in terms apply whenever resort
to foreign law is indicated, irrespective of the purpose of the reference. The
conclusions suggested in this article are applicable only where foreign law
is referred to for the purpose of finding the appropriate rule of decision. 68
Recourse to the law of the forum in order to find the rule of decision
where foreign law has not been invoked in timely and appropriate fashion
by the party seeking its benefits involves no problem under the due process
clause or the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution. Constitutional doubts in this context have been suggested, so far as I know, only
by the California Law Revision Commission, which appears to be particularly
sensitive to the possible influence of the Constitution on choice of law.' 69
Such doubts stem, of course, from the fact that a state may violate one or
both of these clauses by applying its own law when it has no substantial
connection with, or interest in, the matter in litigation and when the effect
is to subvert the interest of another state and deprive a party of rights secured
by the foreign law.1 0 It seems clear, however, that before a party can successfully make the contention that he has been deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or that full faith and credit has been
denied to the laws of another state, he must have brought to the attention
of the court in timely and appropriate fashion the law which is the source
of his rights, or to which he asks the court to give full faith and credit. It
is hardly unconstitutional to deprive people of rights which they do not
168. Two cases prominent in the literature on this problem, In re Circle Trading
Corp., 26 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1928), and Leach v. Pillsbury, 15 N.H. 137 (1844), present
situations in which it would be difficult to advocate application of the law of the forum in
default of a showing of the foreign law. In each the foreign law was wanted not to furnish
the rule of decision but for a collateral purpose. In another leading case, Riley v. Pierce
Oil Corp., 245 N.Y. 152, 156 N.E. 647 (1927), the foreign law appears to have been material, if at all, as the source of the rule of desion, and there seems to be no good reason
why the court should not have applied the law of the forum in the absence of the defendant's invocation of Mexican law.
169. CAL. LAw RFvIstoN Comz'N, op. cit. supra note 27, at 1-12, 1-20; cf. Currie,
Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation it; the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L.
REv. 205 (1958).
170. See id. at 237-39.
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establish or to deny full faith and credit to laws which are not brought to
171
the attention of the court.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Leo Walton's action against the Arabian American Oil Company was
dismissed because the New York rule for choice of law was read as a
mandate to the court to apply the law of Saudi Arabia or none at all.
In the search for a more satisfactory solution we have encountered numerous
difficulties. The problem has been traditionally treated as one of pleading and
proof, and therefore one for experts in evidence, rather than as a fundamental
problem of conflict of laws. The classic introduction to all prescriptions
for dealing with the problem has been: "When foreign law becomes
material . . . ." This introduction has proved to be fraught with ambiguity.
When does foreign law become material-whenever a choice-of-law rule points
to the law of a foreign state, or only when it is invoked by a party seeking
advantage in its provisions? Furthermore, we have found that foreign law
may be material for quite different purposes, and that a solution which seems
acceptable when foreign law is material for one purpose may not be so when
it is material for another. In this century, the dominant philosophy has
dictated the view that foreign law becomes material (as supplying the rule of
decision, at least) merely because the choice-of-law rule refers to it, without
more. This view, coupled with the original prescription that when foreign
law becomes material it is to be pleaded and proved like any other "essential
element" of a cause of action or defense, led to difficulties which the courts
attempted to alleviate, in part, by indulging in presumptions as to the tenor
of the foreign law. In revolt against the formalism of the requirement of
pleading and proof, and some of its incidents, as well as against the artificiality
of the presumptions, modern leaders in the field of evidence have employed
the concept of judicial notice with results which in some respects have
certainly been salutary. The judicial notice concept fails, however, to reach
the heart of the problem. Moreover, this approach, even in its most sophisticated form, unrealistically minimizes the fact that a large expenditure of
energy may be required to ascertain the foreign law; it gives inadequate
consideration to important questions of procedural fairness; it attributes to
foreign law an imperative force quite out of proportion to that possessed by
domestic law generally; and it ignores the different purposes for which foreign
law may be "material."
We have preferred the older view that foreign law becomes material as
furnishing the rule of decision only when it is invoked by a party seeking
171. See Chicago &A.R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 624 (1887).
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advantage from its provisions. In consequence, when the foreign law is not
made to appear in timely and appropriate fashion by the interested party,
the court will apply the law of the forum. We have recognized, however,
that this procedure may not be appropriate in all cases, particularly where
the foreign law is referred to not as the source of the rule of decision but
for some collateral purpose.
The conclusions suggested may be summarized as follows:
1. The normal business of courts being the adjudication of domestic
cases, and the normal tendency of lawyers and judges being to think in terms
of domestic law, the normal expectation should be that the rule of decision
will be supplied by the domestic law as a matter of course.
2. The court should ordinarily depart from this procedure only at the
instance of a party wishing to obtain the advantage of a foreign law.
3. The law of the forum, as the source of the rule of decision, should
normally be displaced only by the interested party's timely invocation of the
foreign law. The interested party invokes the foreign law by calling attention
to its relevance and its superior claim to be applied, and by informing the
court of its tenor. 7 2
4. Since a rule of decision taken from foreign law may materially alter
the issues and the evidence necessary to establish a claim or defense, an
invocation of foreign law should ordinarily not be regarded as timely if it
comes after the issues have been settled. While it is not vital that foreign
law be invoked in the pleadings, it is necessary that it be invoked in the
process by which the issues are settled, whether by pleading, pretrial conference, or otherwise. There may be circumstances in which a later invocation
of foreign law may be permitted without procedural injustice to the opposing
party. Rules as to the amendment of pleadings and of pretrial orders should
furnish helpful analogies for dealing with such situations.
5. The foreign law should be invoked in such a way as to afford the
opposing party full opportunity to (a) resist the contention that the foreign
law is applicable, (b) present to the court his views as to the tenor of the
foreign law, and (c) prepare his case in accordance with the requirements
of the foreign law if it is found applicable.
6. No exclusionary rules of evidence should interfere with the process
of establishing the tenor of the foreign law. The parties may bring to the
attention of the court any pertinent information. Yet if the judge is not
satisfied as to the reliability of the written opinion of an expert, or as to the
172. Whether or not the court will apply the foreign law so invoked will, of course,
depend on conflict-of-laws principles. My somewhat unorthodox views on the methods to
be employed have been suggested in Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-ofLaws Method, 25 U. Ci. L. REv. 227 (1958), and Survival of Actions: Adjudication

Versus Automation it the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. Rxv. 205 (1958).
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authenticity of a publication purporting to state the foreign law, he should
have discretion to require the party to produce the expert for cross-examination, under oath if that seems desirable, or to require documentary proof of
the foreign law in accordance with the rules of evidence. The court should
also be permitted, though not expected, to consult any pertinent source of
information, though not furnished by the parties. In that event, however,
the court should, by making tentative findings or otherwise, give the parties
an opportunity to be heard with respect to the conclusion to be drawn from
such sources.
7. The determination of the tenor of the foreign law should be made
by the judge rather than the jury and should probably be subject to review
on appeal.
8. The law of the forum may also be displaced, at least tentatively,
as the source of the rule of decision, even without the invocation of a foreign
law, by a party's timely demonstration that the governmental policy of the
forum, as expressed in its rule of decision, has no relevance to the case before
the court. The timeliness of such a demonstration should be determined in
the same way as that of an invocation of foreign law. In such a case, the fact
that there is before the court no law which is particularly appropriate to
the disposition of the case is a factor which, in combination with other
factors, may justify dismissal of the action without prejudice on forum non
conveniens grounds. If, however, considerations of justice require that the
action be retained and decided on the merits, the court should determine
it in accordance with the rule of decision found in the law of the forum.
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